




A STUDY OF DISCRETE CONTROL SIGNAL FAULT CONDITIONS




(N ASA-CR- 14-1827) A STUDY OF DISCRETE	 N76-28334
CONTROL SIGNAL FAULT CONDITIONS IN THE
SHUTTLE DPS Final Report (Gaertner CSCL 14B
	
UnclasResearch, Inc.) 116 p HC $5.50	 G3/19 47998
DATES
	 JUNE 30., 1976
PREPARED FOR-. 	 NASA LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS 7705811-
DATE OF CONTRACT:
	 JUNE 27, 1975
PREPARED BY:	 So S. REDDi
C. T. RETTER	 "'Apo'
W. W. GAERTNER RESEARCH., INC.






- TABLE OF CONTENTS --
r
Chapter No .	 Page No.P	 9
1. INTRODUCTION	 1
2. FUNCTIONAL. DESCRIPTION OF IOP DISCRETES 	 4
2.1 Identification Discretes	 7










2.4.2	 CPC Ready	 Indicator Discretes 11
2.4.3	 GPC	 IPL and	 IPL Activate Discretes 11
2.4.4	 1/0 Active	 Indicator Discretes 11
2,4.5 . I/O Terminate Command Discretes 12
2.4.6	 MM IPL Select Command Discretes 12
2.5	 Mass Memory Discretes 12
2.6	 Backup Flight Control 	 System 12
t	 2.7
	 Discretes of GPC 5,	 the Backup System 13




Identification Discrete Failures 46
3.2	 Synchronization Discrete Failures 56





and	 Indicator Discrete Failures 59
3.5	 Discrete Failure Analysis 61



















- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS -
Figure No. Page No.
1. Space Shuttle Avionics System Block Diagram 2












3--4. BCE No/Go	 Procedure	 (FIOBCERR) 18
3-5 MSC Time-Out Procedure	 (FIOMSCTO) 19
3-6. Count Data Path Error Procedure	 (FIOCTDPE) 20
3--7. MM . Management Subroutine	 (FIOMMSTR) 21
3--8. MM Management; Subroutine 	 (FIOMMTMR) 22
3-9. Mass Memory Halt Processor	 (FIOHLTHM) 23
3-10. MSG	 Set Fail	 Discretes Program	 (FIOMSFD) 24
3-11_ Read Blocks from Mass Memory
Routine	 (FCMINMMR) 25
3--12. One Time	 Initialization Routine	 (FCMLINIT) 26
3-13. Power Transi-nt	 Initialization	 (FCMPINIT) 27
3-14. Initial	 SSIP Synchronization
	
(FCMASYNC) 28
3--15. Normal	 SSIP Synchronization	 (FCMSYNC) 29
3--16. 1/0 Synchronization	 (FCMISYNG) 30
3-17. SVC Synchronization 	 (FCMMSSYNC) 31
3-18. Time Synchronization	 (FCMSSYNC) 32
3-19. Fault Detection	 Identification	 (FCMFDI) 33




--	 LIST OF	 ILLUSTRATIONS -
(continued)
Figure No. Page	 No.
3--21. GPC Startup	 (AIC^CPC STARTUP) 35
3-22. GPC Switch Monitor	 (ARA GPC SWITCH) 36
-	 3--23. Timer Qv.,ue Element Expiration	 (FPMIHPC2) 37
3-24. I/O Completion	 Processor 	 (FIOCMPLT) 38
3-25. I/O Error Handler,	 Level	 C	 (FIOERRLC) 39
3--26. BCE No/Go	 Procedure	 (FIOBCERR) 40
3-27. MSC Timeout Procedure	 (FIOMSCTO) 41
3-28. Normal SSIP Synchronization	 (FCMCSYNC) 42
3-29. Timer Synchronization	 (FCMTSYNC) 43
3-30. I/O Synchronization	 (FCMISYNC) 44
3-31. VC Synchronization	 (f= CMSSYNC) 45
4--1.	 System unreliability due to identification
number failure versus	 time	 in	 hours 73
4-2. System unreliability due to	 identification
number failure versus time	 in	 hours for
redundant and coding approaches. 74
4-3. Improvements	 in reliability of the DPS versus
time in hours for redundant and coding
approaches. 75
4--4. DPS unreliability versus time	 in	 hours for
XGPC-100 failures/10 6	hours. 79
4-5. DPS unreliability versus time	 in	 hours for
AGPC`200 failures/10 6 hours. 80
4-6. System unreliability versus 	 time	 in	 hours for
AGPCW500 failures/10 6	hours. 81
iii

LIST OF TABLES .
Table No.	 Page No.
I	 IOP Discretes for CPC N (Orbiter
101, GPC 1-4)	 5
2	 IOP Discretes (Orbiter 101, GPC 5)	 6
3	 Synchronization Codes	 9
4	 List of Discretes Used/Issued by the
FCOS Modules	 47








j	 The space shuttle represents	 a pioneering effort6	
in	 avionics	 history.	 Its	 primary goals	 are to provide
low-cost transportation to and from earth orbit and
to offer a platform for conducting experiments 	 in space. aIt Wiil	 also enable	 deployment and recovery of free flying
or automated satellites.








general-purpose	 digital	 computers,	 each
















The DPS	 is	 intended to	 satisfy the	 stringent reli- 1
ability	 requirements	 imposed	 by the space mission and	 its
design	 ensures fail-safe and fail-soft performance.
Figure 1 shows	 a	 block diagram of the	 space shuttle
avionics	 system.	 The five computer systems,	 GPC1 through
GPG 5,	 comprise the	 DPS and control	 the other avionic sub-
systems
	 through twenty-eight data-bus channels. 	 Each GPC j
consists
	
of a CPO and an
	
IOP;	 the CPU performs mainly com-
putationwhereas	 the	 IOP	 is	 responsible	 for interfacing	 the
CPU with	 the bus channels.	 The GPCs	 communicate their status
or mode	 of computation	 to each other through 	 signals on	 40
input and 32 output	 IOP	 discretes	 [2].	 These discretes	 are
j	 of principal	 interest	 to	 this	 investigation.	 An	 analysis
I	 was	 conducted to determine the impact a fault on these
discretes may have on system performance in terms of re-- .:
liability and fail-safeness.	 The propagation of hardware
discrete
	
faults	 into software and applications 	 program logic
was traced and recommendations were developed to curtail 	 the
propagation as
	




items were accomplished	 by W.	 W.	 Gaertner
Research,
	 Inc.	 during	 its contract with	 NASA-dSC.
1)	 Identification and functional	 description	 of
IOP discretes.
2)	 Identification of operating system 	 (FCOS)	 modules
that use	 IOP discretes	 and the manner of usage.
3) Analysis of the effects of faults on IOP discretes
in terms of system degradation (e.g., loss of a
GPC from the redundant set).
4) Determination of the time that may elapse before
a fault on IOP discretes is detected.
5) Recommendations to prevent/detect faults on IOP
discretes and suggestions for future research.
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Figure 1, Space Shuttle avionics system block diagram (11
. . . . . .	 . . . .
The organization of the report is as follows.
:	 Chapter 2 is exclusively devoted to item (1). 	 Items (2)
{	 (3) and (4) are treated in detail in Chapter 3. Chapter
4 discusses probabilistic aspects of IOP discrete fault
occurrences and presents an assessment of system,failure
rate. In Chapter 5 methods of prevention/detection.of
TOP discrete faults and recommendations are made that
may be incorporated into system hardware/software to im-
prove mission reliability. Chapter 5 presents methods
of recovering CPCs lost because of non-synchronization
during OFT phase. This chapter also discusses alterna-
tive approaches to the design of redundant: avionic com-
puter systems and future work.
The initial phase of this Contract was monitored by
Mr. Curtis D. Warnick and the final phase by Mr. Allen E.
Brandli, both of NASA-JSC, Houston, Texas. They were ex-
tremely helpful in procuring technical documents on the
space shuttle and arranging conferences with appropriate
technical personnel. Discussions with the following
individuals were beneficial in gaining insight inter the
space shuttle data processing: Messrs. Charles Floyd,
Sam Ankney and Ed Dalke of NASA--JSC; and Jerry Johnson
and Vic Harrison of Rockwell International Space Division.
This report was prepared with the assistance of Mona C.




2. FUNCTIONAL DESCR 7.PTION OF IOP DISCRETES 	 c.
In this chapter each IOP discrete is identified in
terms of the label of specification used in System Level
Description, Hardware, CPDS, Volume 1, Book 1 [31 and the
IOP pin numbers used in the actual hardware construction
	
3'
of the IOPs [4]. This allows traceability of IOP discretes 	 K
from their functional specifications to their physical loca-
tions,a feature useful for trouble-shooting and design al-
terations. Then the function for which each IOP discrete is
intended is described. This functional description gives an 	 +
overview of the important and critical role played by the
discretes in the overall data and control management.
F
The IOP discretes of a GPC serve one of the following
functions:
(a) Local control and status indication of the CPC,




-	 The discretes that perform.function (a) issue commands such
as halt, standby, run and IPL initiate and indicate the mode 	 >
of the CPC, e.g., halt, standby and IPL-in-progress. The
discretes assigned to function (b) are vital to synchronous
performance of the GPCs. They indicate whether a particular
GPC is in a redundant set and enable.synchronization of GPCs
after I/O transactions, supervisory calls and timer interrupts.
Discretes that perform (c) are used to indicate the assessment
of each CPC regarding the functional behavior of other GPCs.
Voting logic is incorporated in these discretes to decide
whether a particular GPC is functioning correctly.
As may be noted, discretes performing (b) and. (c) are
not needed if the GPC is intended to be operated alone as
a backup flight control system. Accordingly the discretes
for GPC 5 are wired differently from the others. In Table
1 IOP discretes are shown for GPCs 1 to 4 with their labels,
p1n numbers, functional identifications, sources and destina-



































GPC ID source output. IOP	 N a
GPC ID bit 0	 (binary 1) input lopN
GPC ID	 bit 1
	 (binary
	
2) inp ut lo p	 N r
GPC ID	 bit	 2	 (binary 4) input IOP	 N
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
GPC N+1	 fail	 vote	 in -input IOP N+1 1.
GPC N+2 Mail
	
vote in input lo p N+2 i
GPC N+3 fail
	
vote in input IOP	 N+3^
GPC fail	 indicator output panels
GPC N+1 fail	 vote out output IOP N+1 i
GPC N+2 fail
	
vote out output IOP N+2
CPC N+3 fail	 vote out output IOP	 N+3 Y'
SYNCHRONIZATION
GPC N+1 sync bit I input IOP N+1
GPC N+2 sync bit 1 input IOP N+2
GPC N+3 sync	 bit 1 input TO .P	 N +3
GPC N+1 sync bit 2 input IOPN+1
GPC N+2 sync bit 2 input
lop 
N+2
GPC N+3 sync bit 2 input IOP N+3
GPC N+1 sync bit 3 input IOPN+1
GPC N+2 sync bit 3 input lo p N+2
GPC N+3 sync bit 3 input IOP	 N+3,
GPC N	 sync bit 1 output 3	 IOPs
GPC N	 sync bit 2 output 3	 IOPs
GPC N	 sync bit 3 output 3	 IOPs
CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
I/O active	 indicator output panel
GPC ready	 indicator output panel
GPC IPL	 indicator output panel
GPC halt command input panel
GPC standby command input panel
GPC run command input panel
GPC IPL activate command input panel
A
MMI IPL select command input panel
MM2 IPL select command input panel
I/O terminate command A input panel
1/0 terminate command B, BFCS	 input panel
+ 5 volts output panels f
Signal	 return output panels
MASS MEMORY
MMI reset output MM1
MM2 reset output MM2
MMI ready input MM1
MM2 ready input MM2
BFCS



























Table 1. TOP Discretes for GPC N (Orbiter 101, GPC 1--4)
LABEL. TOP PINS FUNCTION	 IDENTIFICATION 1/0 FR.OM/TO
D030 J3-57,58 CPC	 ID source output IOP
	
5
DI32 J3--74,75 GPC	 ID	 bit 0	 (binary 1) input TOP5
DI33 J3- 116,123 GPC	 ID bit 1	 (binary 2) input lop 	 r
DI34 J3-107,122 GPC	 ID	 bit	 2	 (binary	 4-) input IOP	 5
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
DROOO J5-46,58 GPC	 f: 	 i1	 -indicator output panels
CONTROLS ;,ND INDICATORS
D009 J3--25,37 GPG ready indicator output panel
DI00 J5-1,2 GPC halt command input panel
DI01 J5-3,4 GPC standby command input panel
DIO2 J5-5,6 GPC run command input panel
EXCIT J3-110 + 5 volts output panels
S J3-100 Signal	 return output panels
BFCS
DI13 05-27,28 I/O terminate command B inverse	 input BFCS
.DI11 J5-23,x4 BFCS engage command input BFCS
1	 DI15 J3-66,67 BFCS engage command input BFCS
DI16 J3-58,89 BFCS engage command input BFCS
D008 J3-61.,6.2 BFCS fail output BFCS
E





In the following, the primary function of each discrete
is described in detail. The above functional classification is
used to clarify its role.
2.1 Identification Discretes
Each computer contains three ID discrete inputs, which are
used to allow the computer to determine the position in which it
has been installed. The 3-bit binary code which identifies each
computer position is farmed by wiring the constant differential 	 1r'
output of the ID Source line driver to each ID input bit with
the appropriate polarity,, For example, the computer in Forward 	 i
Avionics Bay III is GPC 3,' so the connector for IOP J3 at that	 i
position must have ID bits 0 and I w-ired.directly to the ID Source
and ID bit 2 wired to the ID Source with inverted polarity. The
connections between the ID Source differential output and the
three ID differential inputs are as follows [41: i
LOCATION	 COMPUTER	 ID BIT 2	 ID BIT 1	 ID BIT 0
Forward Avionics	 GPC 1	 inverted	 inverted	 direct
Bay I	 GPC 4	 direct	 inverted	 inverted	 a
i,
k	 !	 {
Forward Avionics	 GPC 2	 inverted	 direct	 inverted
Bay II	 GPC 5	 direct	 inverted	 direct
Forward Avionics	 GPC 3	 inverted	 direct	 direct
Bay III
The identification discretes serve function (a) and are
primarily used in the initialization routine. In this routine
the GPC number is read from the discretes and stored in internal
software tables (Compool and CVT) and thereafter these tables
are consulted for GPC identification numbers. The identifica-
tion numbers are ased to select the prime computer system as
well as to track the GPCs that -Failed to synchronize in a re-
dun.dant set.
2.2 Redundancy Management Discretes
Three input and four output discretes are assigned to the
redundancy management function. Signals on three of the output
discretes (DR007, 08, 09) are issued from one GPC to other GPCs
to indicate failure votes. A failure vote is issued under soft-
ware control by one GPC to another when there is a mismatch be-
tween their computed results. The fourth output discrete (AROOO)
is a GPC fail indicator.
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It indicate-s that the GPC has detected a BITE self--test
failure or has been voted out of the GPC voting set. The
signal is automatically issued upon I0P hardware detection
of two or more failure votes from other IOPs of the voting
set, expiration of the watchdog timer, or detection of GPC
self-test failure (providing these functions have been enabled
or initiated by GPC software). It should be noted that the CPU
is not reset upon GPC../IOP failure determination, and CPU instruc-
tion execution is still possible after a GPC failure. The IQP
hardware reset of all GPC outputs, however, prevents the GPC
from participating in the control of the Space Shuttle vehicle.
The GPC fail indicator output signal from each GPC termi-
nates at two units: a 5-by-5 computer (failure) status display
matrix, and the caution/warning electronics unit. In addition,
at the 5-by--5 display, the GPC fail indicators are amplified
and sent to operational instrumentation where they are sampled
for downlink transmission.
The caution/warning electronics unit accepts the GPC fail
indicator signals and retransmits them to a caution/warning
status display (120 indicators). The GPC fail indicator sig-
nal from each GPC may be monitored at this display. The elec-
tronic unit also transmits the logical  Oil of all -Five GPC fall
indicator signals to the caution/warning annunciator display
where a single light is turned on. When this signal is issued,
it is accompanied by an audible alarm that remains on until
manually reset from either of two master alarm reset switches
located at the forward station.
The 5-by--5 computer (failure) status display is driven by
all five redundancy management output signals from each TOP (four
failure votes and one -Failed condition). Since there are five
GPCs, there are a total of 25 indicators. The GPC fail indicator
for a given GPC lies along the matrix diagonal from the upper left
to the lower right. All other indicators represent fail votes.
The 5-by-5 display matrix allows visual observation of the fail-
ure status of all five GPCs [21.
The redundancy management function is invoked after every
SSIP cycle at -Forty millisecond intervals. The GPCs transfer
data to each other on Inter--Computer Communication (ICC) bus
units so that they can compare and vote on each other.
2.3 Synchronization Discretes
These discretes convey the status of GPCs to each
other so that they can be run in synchrony. Each GPC
has three output discretes which indicate its 
.
synchroniza-
tion status. Table , 3 gives the synchronization codes used
in the space shuttle complex. Log i c Os on all the output
discretes indicate that the CPC is not operative and.does
not participate in computation or control. The-110 codes'
(010 and 011) indicate that the GPC completed its 1/0
transactions with or without encountering errors in data
transmission. The timer .end . SVC interrupts indicate that
the GPC was interrupted by a time-out indication from one
of its timers and by supervisory call from an application
or FCOS program respectively. SSIP synchronization code
is used to synchronize the•&PCs in the common sot at every
SSIP cycle. Logic Is on tha output discretes indicate
that the GPC is either running or expecting other GPCs to
synchronize.
The s;;nc;,rani zati on discretes are used quite often
(at rates of approximately 300 times/sec) and the ma nner in








I/O Complete, with error (IPR)
3	 all	 I/O Complete, no error (IOC)
4	 100	 SSIP sync (common set)	 ^-
5	 101	 Timer Interrupt	 p'
2.4 Control and Indicator Discretes
These discretes are primarily used to control and indicate
the status of the GPC they are associated with. They perform
function (a) and play a critical part in interfacing the CPC
and the crew.
2.4.1 GPC Halt/Sta.ndby/Run Command Discretes
These discretes are controlled by a three-position toggle
mode switch from Cockpit Panel 07. A separate switch is pro-
vided for each GPC.	 :
Each switch provides three input signals (Halt, Standby,
or Run) to the respective discrete. The three signals are
inierlocked in IOP hardware logic: so that only one switch
state is possible regardless of any switch bounce that is en-
countered. For example, when the switch is moved from one
position to another, the switch leaves the first position,
encounters an open--circuit, and then makes contact at the
second position. During the open-circuit transition, the
previous switch state is maintained in hardware latches in
the IOP. Open-circuit signals do not change the state of
these latches.
When the switch completes the open-circuit transition
and finally makes contact at the next position, the new state
is detected and stored by the interlocked latches. At this
point, should switch bounce be encountered, producing momentary
open--circuit conditions, the hardware latches guarantee that
the switch state just established will be retained. The IOP
logic thus guards against switch bounce.
When the Halt Command discrete is set, an automatic reset
of both the CPU and IOP is caused. In this reset state, normal
macro instructions cannot be executed in the CPU and IOP; how-
ever the GPC can support IPL, and Halt is the only state in
which IPA, can be performed.
When the Standby discrete is set, the GPC is able to
operate in an off-line mode, not synchronized to other GPCs.
The Standby mode is identical to the Run mode except that it
does not completely utilize the memory and configuration
tables. In the Standby mode, application programs can be
run, thus making it possible to test and diagnose system opera-
tion. The GPC in Standby mode has less priority than a GPC in
Run more in order to prevent IOP bus contentions when one or
more GPCs are in Standby [6] .
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iThe Run mode is used during normal GPC operations.
However, this mode can be overridden by software in
which case the GPC Ready Talkback indicator will in-
dicate barberpole rather than gray.
2.4.2 GPC Ready Indicator Discrete
This discrete drives a barberpole/gray flag indicator
to indicate the GPC status. When the discrete bit (DO09)
is set true, the indicator is driven to the gray position
to indicate that the GPC is ready for normal processing.
The IPL discrete can also drive this indicator to gray
when IPL is in progress. 'The GPC J Ready indicator for
ALT phase indicates that backup flight control capability
is resident and can be processed by engaging BFCS switch.
When the discrete bit.is false, the indicator is driven
to barberpole to indicate that the GPC is not ready. This
indication is present when the GPC detects a hardware or
software error. Some of the hardware detected errors are
IOP timing fault, power supply failure/off, and parity
errors within the CPU. Also a Halt mode and Command can
cause this indication.
2.4.3 GPC IPL and IPL Activate Discretes
The GPC IPL discrete when true indicates that the GPC
is performing IPL. The IPL Activate discrete is driven by
a momentary pushbutton switch on the cockpit panel. Depres-
sion of the switch sets the IPL Activate discrete true and
causes IPL to be performed. The IPL discrete as mentioned
before will drive the Ready talkback indicator gray to indi-
cate IPL--in-progress. The IPL Activate command will be
effective only when the GPC is in a Halt state.
2.4.4 I/O Active Indicator Discrete
This discrete indicates the status of the GPC as to
whether it can perform I/O on its data buses. A true out-
put indicates that the GPC is ready to perform I/O after GPC
initialization whereas a false output indicates either that
the GPC is powered off or that the GPC, though powered on,
is unable to perform I/O because of its I0P reset state or
non completion of GPC initialization.
II
2.4.5 I/O Terminate Command Discretes
There are two discretes assigned for I/O terminate
function. The I/O Terminate Command A discrete is de-
rived from one pole of a double--pole output terminate
switch on Panel 07.	 (The other pole issues the IOP
Terminate Command B discrete). This Command causes
immediate disable of four MIA transmitters for buses
FC 1 through FC 4. The discrete input is always accom-
panied by the IOP Terminate Command B discrete.
The IOP Terminate Command B discrete is controlled
by the second pole of the output terminate switch and
when this command is received, eight MIA transmitters
are immediately disabled to halt data transmission over
flight--critical buses FC 5 through FC 8, payload buses
PL 1 and PL 2 and launch data buses LDB 1 and LDB 2.
The Backup Flight Control.(BFC) switches on panels F 2
and F 4 also control the IOP Terminate Command B discrete.
2.4.6 MM IPL Select Command Discretes
These discretes specify which Mass Memory unit has
been selected for IPL operation of the GPC.
2.5 Mass Memory Discretes
Each Mass Memory generates a ready signal and controls
the state of the MM Ready discrete of each GPC. A ready sig-
nal, when enabled, indicates to the GPC that the MM is in
the standby mode and is capable of accepting commands. If
not enabled, it indicates that either the MM primary power
is off or that the MM is performing an operation. In the
latter case, it will stay in the not--ready state until the
operation being performed is complete.
Reset discrete signals, one from each GPC, can inter-
rupt the operation of the Mass Memory unit. When interrupted
by the reset signal, the MM will halt its operation at the
end of the current data block, stop the tape in the next
subfile, and write protect all tracks. When these opera-
tions are completed, the ready signal is enabled to the
GPCs. If the MM is already in the ready state, no action
will occur as a result of the reset.
2.6 Backup Flight Control System Engage Command Discrete
When this discrete is true, it means that the BFC En-
gage switch on panels F 2 or F 4 is on and that the fliqtit
controlis to be transferred from the Primary to the Backup
Control System. When the discrete is false, it indicates
that the BFC Engage switch is in `off ` position and that
12
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flight control is handled by the Primary system.
2.7 Discretes of GPC 5, the Backup System
GPC 5 is used for the Backup Flight Control System
(BFCS). The BFCS can be engaged by pressing one of the
two BFC Engage switches. When one of these switches is
pushed, the BFCS Control Unit sends the I/O Terminate
Command B to all of the computers. However, the polarity
of this signal is reversed for GPC 5, with the result
that GPCs 1-4 have their flight-critical outputs disabled,
and GPC 5 has its.outputs enabled, when a BFC switch is
pushed. BFC Engage indicators, located in the BFC switches,
are controlled by MOM FF5.
The discrete signals for GPC 5 are listed in Table 2.
(Since GPC 5 is not used in conjunction with the other four
computers, -there are no Fail Votes or synchronization sig-
nals to or from GPC 5).	 In addition to the Fail Votes and
synchronization signals, several other discrete control sig-
nals are not used in GPC 5. No I/O Terminate switch exists
for GPC 5, so the I/O Terminate Command A discrete input is
not used. Since the BFCS does not use the Mass Memories,
there are no Mass memory Ready, Reset, or IPL Select signals
connected to GPC 5; there is no IPL Activate switch/indicator
and, therefore, the corresponding discrete signals are not





3. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EFFECTS OF FAULTS ON DISCRETES
In this Chapter the primary and secondary effects of
faults on the IOP discretes are discussed. First the Flight
Computer Operating System (FCOS) modules that use these dis-`
cretes and the manner of their usage are identified. This
enables one to trace the propagation of errors from hard- 	 '.
ware to software. Secondly, each of these FCOS modules is
analyzed to determine the effects of misinterpretation of 	 } r
the logic levels on the discretes due to single bit errors.
This information will be useful in recovering CPCs that are
lost due to discrete failures either in the OFT or past-mis-
sion phase_ It is also useful for modifying software modules
so that the impact of discrete failures on system performance
is minimized. Thirdly,'the impact of each discrete failure
on the total system is described. This will give an assess-
ment of the relative criticality of each discrete. Finally,
the minimum time before the detection of a discrete failure
is estimated and suggestions are made to further reduce this
time.
The FCOS is a set of code blocks which manages the DPS
computer hardware complex and allocates its resources to all
OFP functions. It is responsible for the control services
and allocation of computer resources, as well as the super-
vision of all computing processes in the OFP. It also pro-
vides a number of service functions, such as input/output,
interrupt supervision and time/event services. The FCOS is
a tool used by the application programmer and, when taken by
itself, does not provide a mission software design. The FCOS
does not partition or specify how software functions are di-
vided between computers or within a computer. The FCOS does,
however, provide the stricture for controlling individual soft-
ware functions to meet individual mission requirements [6].
k
Thus the FCOS serves as the interface between the hardware
and the application programmer and represents the first stage
in Control transition from hardware to software. Some of the
FCOS modules interpret and act on the logic signals they read
on the discretes. The flow-charts of these modules are shown
in Figures 3-1 to 3--22. (They are extracted from Reference
The modules that issue commands which cause logic level
transitions on the discrete lines are analyzed to determine
the effects of single-bit discrete errors. The flow-charts of
these modules are shown in Figures 3-23 to 3--31. They indicate
the correct commands to be issued (shown enclosed by double lines)
as well as the incorrect commands that may be issued due to a
single discrete failure (shown enclosed by a single line). Thus
14
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in the flow-chars: of the Timer Queue Element Expiration
(FPMIHPC2) module, at the beginning instead of issuing the
NLJRN synchronization command, the module may issue IOC,
TIMER or SVC synchronization commands. Table 4 summarizes
the effects of single discrete errors on the FCOS modules
by listing each module that uses/issues discretes along
with the manner of invocation of the module and the dis-
cretes (identified by their labels and pin numbers) that
the module uses/issues.
	
It also lists the possible mis-
interpretation of discretes due to single bit discrete
errors.
4
In the following, each discrete is considered individu-
ally 'Go analyze its precise role in the DPS and how its
failure can affect the system performance. The discussion
will be qualitative and establish the relative criticality
of each discrete. The discrete is analyzed by listing the
FCOS modules it is used in, describing qualitatively the
manner in which the discrete-is used in software logic, and
depicting consequences that may ensue because of the discrete
failure. In addition, an estimate is given of the time that
may elapse before the failure is detected.
3.1 Identification Discrete Failures
These discretes are used by the following software
modules directly or indirectly:
Module	 Page No. [51	 Usage
FIOMMRLV	 3.2-61, Part 1	 Indirect
FCMLINIT	 3.3-11, Part 1	 Direct
FCMDSSTR	 3.3074, Part 1	 Indirect
FCMRELST
	
3.3-75, Part 1	 Indirect
FCMENSTR
	
3.3-77, Part 1	 Indirect
FCMSATCN
	
3,3-81, Part 1	 Indirect
FCMSFAIL
	
3.3--89, Part 1	 Indirect
ARC
—
GPC RECONFIG 3.2-19, Part 2	 Indirect
;i
The hardware discretes are read directly by the One
Time Initialization Routine, FCMLINIT, and the identifica-
tion number of the GPC is stored in COMPOOL and CVT. There-
after, the identification number is fetched whenever needed
from these two tables. This number is used in software
mostly to select the prime GPC among the Redundant Set. At
hardware level, the identification number is used to assign
proper control of data buses to the GPC. For example, the





	 INVOCATION USE DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM. LOG
	
INPUT
	 DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT 4!1_L CAUSE
REF. NO. 5
	











NIA	 N/A NIA	 N/A









J3-34,35 1 3 IOPS	 IPR SYNC
'J3-46,47 1	 SSIP SYNC
J3-43,44 0	 TIMER SYNC
J3-34,35 0 3 IOPS	 SVC SYNC
J3-46, 117 1	 MLT/OFF/FL
OR
J3-43,44 1	 SSIP SYNC
J3-34,35 0 3 LOPS	 NULL/RUN
J3-46,47 I	 SPARE
J3-43,44 1	 IPR SYNC
J3-34,35 1 3 IOPS	 SPARE
J3-46,47 0	 NULL/RUN
OR
J3-43,44 0	 IOC SYNC
0-34,35 1 .3 IOPS	 HLT/OFF/FL

















PAGE	 MODULE	 INVOCATION USE DISCRETE$ LABEL PIN NUM. LOG	 INPUT DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE
REF. NO. 5
	
OR	 USED	 VAL	 FROM	 ISSUED	 VAL TO DISCRETES
Is-	 TO BE .INTER-
SUE	 PRETED.AS
3
D020 J3-43,44 1 SPARE
1 NULL SYNC D024 J3-34,35 1 3 IOPS IPR SYNC
SOtTWARE GE-- 0028 J3-4.6,47 1 SSIP SYNC
1-3.2-12A FIOCMPLT MER ;TED HARD- NONE N/A NIA NIA NIA
.j.. VIARE IOP IRPT D02D J3-43,44 1 IPR SYNC
2 IOC SYNC D024 J3-34,$5 1 3	 LOPS - SPARE
1 D02B J3--46,47 0 NULL/RUN
CALL FROM Don J3-43; 114 1' IPR SYNC
1-3.2-34 FIOERRLC FLOCMPLT OR 1	 NONE N/A.' N/A N/A NIA IOC SYNC D024 U3-34,35 1 3 IOPS SPARE
FIOMMMGR D028 J3-46,47 0 NULL/RUN
EXECUTED FROM D020 J3-43,44 0 IOC SYNC
'a	 1-3.2--37 F.IOBCERR FIOERRLC 1	 NONE NIA N/A' N/A NIA IPR SYNC D024 J3-34j35 1- , 3 IOPs HLT/OFF/FL
DO2:8 J3-46,47 , 0 SVC SYNC
EXECUTED FROM D020 J3-43,44 .0 IOG SYNC
1-3.2-39 FTOMSCTO FIOERRLC 1	 NONE NIA NIA N/A NIA IPR SYNC DO24 J3-34,35 1 3 lo ps HLT/oFF/FL
i D028 J3-46,47 0 SVC SYNC




1-3.2-43 FIOCTDPE FIOSCERR OR 2	 TERMINATE DI09 d5-1,2 1 PANEL NONE NIA N/A N/A NIA NIA
FIOMSCT0
3	 BFCS ENGAGE DI11 J5-23,24 1 PANEL.







PAGE	 MODULE	 INVOCATION USE DISCRETE5 LABEL PIN NUM. LOG
	 INPUT OTSCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE
REF. NO. 5	 OR	 USED	 VAL	 FROM	 ISSUED	 VAL TO	 DISCRETESis- TO BE.INTER-
SUE	 PRETEp AS
LD
1	 MMI READY DI06 J5-• 12,13 ? MM1
EXECUTED FROM 1	 MM2 READY DI07 J5-15,16 ? MM2
1-3.2-52 FIOMMSTR FTOMMPII
2	 MMI IPL SEL DI04 J5-8,9 ? PANEL
2	 MM2 IPL SEL DI05 J5-10,11 ? PANEL
I	 MMI READY DI06 J5-12,13 ? MMI
EXECUTED FROM I	 MM2 READY DI07 J5-15,16 ? MM2
1-3.2--54 FIOMMTMR FIOMMMGR
2	 MMI. IPL SEL D104 J5-8,9 ? PANEL
2	 MM2 IPL SEL D105 J5-10,11 ? PANEL
CALL FROM
1--3.2-59 FIGHLTMM FPMSVC 1 NONE NIA N/A MIA MIA
I
CALL FROM 1
1-3.2-80 FIOMSFD FCMSVC OR 1 NONE N/A N/A NIA MIA
FCMFDI 1
1
NONE. N/A NIA MIA NIA MIA






	 ? 14M1	 CONTINUE
MM2 RESET DO13 J3-17,27 ? MM2 	 CONTINUE
N+1 FAIL	 DR007 J5-44,45 7 TOP N+1 NOT FAILED
N+2 FAIL
	
DROO8 J5-42;43 ? TOP N+2 NOT FAILED
N+3 FAIL
	
DROO9 05-40,41 ? IOP N+3 NOT FAILED
GPC FAIL	 DROOD J5-46,58 ? PANEL	 NOT FAILED
EXECUTED FROM 1
1-.3.3-10 FCMINMMR FCMINSSL 	 1
EXECUTED FROM 1






GPC ID BITO DI32
GPC ID BITI 0133
GPC ID BIT2 D134














IOP N	 NONE	 MIA
IOP N
issued by the FCOS modules
MIA NIA N/A	 MIA







PAGE	 MODULE	 INVOCATION	 USE DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM. LOG	 INPUT DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE
REF. N0. 5
	
OR	 USED	 VAL	 FROM	 ISSUED	 VAL	 TO	 DISCRETES
	




1-3.3-17 FCMPINIT MODE SWITCH IN 1 STANDBY
	






	 N/A	 NIA	 N/A
RUN OR STDBY
1 GPC N+1 SB1 D120 J3-80,91 ? IOP N+1
1 GPC N+2 SB1 D121 J3-92,104 ? TOP N+2
Ul	 1 GPC N+3 SB1 D122 J3-103,1111? IOP N+3
C]	 1 GPC N+1 SB2 D124 J3-113,121? TOP N+1




1 GPC 14+3 SB2 D126 J3-101,111? TOP N+3
1 GPC N+1 5B3 DI28 J3-119,126? 1OP N+1
1 GPC N+2 SB3 DI29 J3-99,109 ? IOP N+2
1 GPC N+3 SB3 D130 J3-118,125? TOP N+3
1 GPC N+1 S81 D120 J3-80,91 ? TOP N+1
1 GPC N+2 581 0121 J3-92,104 ? ]OP N+2
1 GPC N+3 581 D122 J3-103,114? TOPN+3
1 GPC N+1 SB2 D124 J3-113,121? lop N+1
1 GPC N+2 SB2 D125 J3-112,128? TOP N+2
1 GPC N+3 SB2 DI26 J3-101,111? IOP N+3
1-3.3-25 FCMCSYNC FPMIHPC2 CALL 1 GPC N+l S83 DI2B J3-119,126? IOP N+1
1 GPC N+2 583 DI29 J3-99,109 ? IOP N+2
1 GPC N+3 5B3 DI30 J3-118,125? TOP N+3
	2 	 GPC N SB1	 D020 13-43,44 1 3 LOPS SPARE
	
2	 GPC N SB2	 D024 03-34,35 1 3 IOPS IPR SYNC
	
	 GPC N SB3
	 D028 J3-4G,47 1 3 IOPS SSIP SYNC















DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUN LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE















1 GPC N+1 SBI DI20
1 GPC N+2 SB1 DI21
1 GPC 11+ 3 SDI D122
1 GPC N+1 S52 Df24
1 GPC N+2 5132 D125
1 GPC N+3 S132 0125
1 GPC N+1 SB3 D128
I GPC N+2 S53 DI29
















D020 J3-43,44 1 3 TOPS SPARE
D024 J3-34,35 1 3 LOPS IPR SYNC





Table 4 {continued]. List of discretes used / issued by the FCOS modules
SEQ	 SINGLE BIT
OFERRORS
PAGE	 MODULE	 INVOCATION	 USE DISCRETES LABEL PIPS NUM. LOG 	 INPUT DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE
REF. NO. 35	 OR	 USED	 VAL
	
FROM	 ISSJED	 VAL TO DISCRETES







2 GPC N+l SB1 13I20 J3--80,51 ? IOP N+1
2 GPC N+2 Sal DI21 J3-92,104 ? IOP N+2
CALL FROM 2 GPC N+3 SB1 DI22 J3-103,114? TOP N+3
SEVERAL MODS. 2 GPC N+1 S82 DI24 J3-113,121? TOP N+1
1-3.3-35 FCMSSYNC LISTED IN
	 2 GPC N+2 SB2 DI25 J3-112,128? TOP N+2
REF.52,3.3-28 2 GPC N+3 SB2 DI26 J3-101,111? TOP N+3
FCOS	 2 GPC N+l SB3 DI28 J3^119,126? IOP N+1
2 GPC N+2 S83 0129 J3-99,109 ? IOP N+2






SVC SYNC	 D024 J3-34,35 1 3 IOPS SSIP SYNC
D028 J3-46,47 1	 IPR SYNC
GPC N SB1	 D020 J3-43,44 1 3 IOPS SPARE
GPC N SB2	 0024 0-34,35 1 3 IOPS IPR SYNC
GPC N SB3
	
D028 J3-•46.47 1 3 IOPS SSIP SYNC





MODULE	 INVOCATION USE DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM. LOG 	 INPUT DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE
REF. NO. 5
	
OR	 USED	 VAL	 FROM	 ISSUED	 VAL TO	 DISCRETES
IS-	 TO BE INTER-
SUE	 PRETED AS
1 GPC N+1 SBI
1 GPC N+2 SBI
1 r-PC N+3 SBI
1 GPC N+1 SB2
1 GPC N+2 SB2
1 GPC N+3 SB2
1-3,3-37 FCMTSYNC FPMIHPC2 CALL 1 GPC N+1 SB3
1 GPC N+2 SB3




1-3.3-39 FCMFDI	 FIOCMPLT CALL 1	 NONE
? GPC N+1 FLI
1-3.3-93 FCMSVC	 FPMSVC CALL	 ? GPC N+2 FLI























GPC N S81	 D020 J3^43,44 1
GPC N SB2	 D024 J3-34,35 1
GPC N SB3	 D028 J3-46,47 1
(A N/A	 UPC FAIL	 DRO00 J5-46,58 1
TOP N+1 GPC N+1 FLO DR007 J5-44,45 ?
IOP N+2 GPC N+ 2 FLO ORODB J5-42,43 ?
TOP N+3 GPC N+3 FLO DR009 J5-40,41
GPC N FLO	 DRO00 J5-46,58 ?
3 IOP$ SPARE
3 TOPS IPR SYNC






Table 4 (continued). List of discretes used/issued by the FCOS modules
-,ut	 ..	 ra ..	 .^ ...... _	 ... _.... !L	 s.,........:...:^.....a..,... 	 ..	 _ _ _ .	 . ^^.f.a.....,.::...a..._ ^,. 	 ^...y....,,,.^.a.L..el 
SEQ	 SINGLE BIT
OF	 ERRORS
PAGE	 MODULE	 INVOCATION	 USE DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM. LOG 	 INPUT	 DISCRETES LABEL PIN NUM LOG OUTPUT WILL CAUSE
i	 REF. NO. 5	 OR	 USED	 VAL	 FROM	 ISSUED	 VAL	 TO	 DISCRETES
Is-	 -	 TO BE INTER-
SUE	 PRETED AS
3-3.1-15	 AIC_GPC_	 GPC STARTUP	 1 NONE NIA N/A NIA NIA GPC READY	 D009	 J3 -25,37	 1	 PANEL	 NOT READY
1 GPC RUN DIO2 J5-5,6 ? PANEL
1 GPC STANDBY D101 J5-3,4 ? PANEL
1 BFCS ENGAGE DI11 J5-23,24 ? PANEL
Ln	 3-3.25	 ARA GPC	 SWITCH MONIT 1 310 TERM.A D312 J5-25,26 ? PANEL
-P	 SWITCH	 1 1/0 TERM.B DT13 J5-27,28 ? PANEL
110 TERM.A	 D112	 J5-25,26	 ?	 PANEL
I/O TERM.B
	
0113	 J5-27,28	 ?	 PANEL
Table 4 (continued). List of discretes uspd/issued by the FCGS modules
..	 t
t	 connected to all the CPCs. When CPCi desires to communi-
cate with other CPCs through the ICC buses, it selects
IM with the aid of the identification number stored in
CVT and COMPOOL.
The requirement that each CPC correctly records and
maintains the identification number is crucial to space
shuttle operation; if this requirement is not met, either
because of discrete failure or faulty core locations, the
ensuing consequences will be unpredictable. When two CPCs
have the same identification number and attempt to trans-
mit information on a common bus, signal interference results.
If this bus is not flight--critical or an ?CC bus unit, data
bus I/O failures will be recorded and this may eventually
lead to bus masking and its removal. However, if this bus
happens to be either critical or an ICC bus, the CPCs in
command of the bus will force themselves to synchronization
failures. Thus the two CPCs will drop out from the redun-
dant as well as the common set. If they attempt to communi-
cate their-synchronization failures and use the same data
bus for doing so, signal interference once again results
with the consequence that the crew may not be notified. At
this point, the situation becomes unpredictable and may even
lead to loss of spacecraft control.
The CPS requirements stipulate that the software shall
support a display which monitors the operational status of
each CPC in Redundant Set, simplex, failed or OFF/HALT mode [61
Thus the crew may note from the display that the two CPCs
are not functioning properly and may engorge the Backup Flight
Control Switch.
The time that might elapse before detection of the iden-
tification discrete failure is variable. Since the identi-
fication discretes are read on the ground prior to the mission,
any discrete failures at this time will be immediately notice-
able. Once the discretes are read, the identification number
is fetched only from the internal CPC tables and hence the
identification failure may result due to core memory location
faults.	 If this happens, the time of detection is unpredict-
able and depends to a large extent on the crew action.
A quantitative assessment of the identification failure
will be given in the next chapter.
55
Synchronization discretes are used by the following
software modules directly or indirectly:
Module Page	 ). [51 Usage
FPMIHPC2 3.2--49, Part I Direct
FIOCMPLT 3.2-12a, Part 1 Direct'
FIOERRLC 3.2-34, Part I Direct
FIOBCERR 3.2-37, Part 1 Direct
FIOMSCTO 3.2-39, Part 1 Direct
FCMASYNC 3.3-23, Part I Direct
FCMCSYNC 3.3-25, Part I Direct
FCMISYNC 3.3-29, Part I Direct
FCMSSYNC 3.3-35., Part 1 Direct
FCMTSYNC 3.3-37, Part I Direct
FCMSMAN 3.3-63, Part I Indirect
FIOSVC 3.2-9,	 Part 1 Indirect
FIOSVCP 3.2--12, Part I* Indirect
FPMCANCL 3.1-35, Part 1 Indirect
FPMCLOSE 3.1-27, Part 1 Indirect
FPMIEPCT 3.1-39, Part I Indirect
FPMOPSCN 3.1-38a, Part I Indirect
FPMRES 3.1-19, Part I Indirect
FPMRESET 3.1-67, Part I Indirect
FPMSCHED 3.1-9,	 Part 1 Indirect
FPMSET 3.1-68, Part 1 Indirect
FPMSIGNL 3.1-69, Part I Indirect
FPMSTAT 3.1-25, Part I Indirect
FPMTERM 3.1-31, Part I Indirect
FPMTMHAL 3.1-63, Part I Indirect
FPMUPRIO 3.1-23, Part 1 Indirect
FPM WAIT 3.I-17, Part I Indirect
FCMPMOD 3.3-53, Part I Indirect
FCMBCEMD 3.3-55, Part I Indirect
FCMPOVLY 3.3-49, Part I Indirect
FJOHLTMM 3.2-7I, Part 1* Indirect
FPMUPMTU 3.1-55, Part I Indirect
FPMMTURM 3.1 -73, Part 1* Indirect
*Reference (71
The software modules listed under direct usage issue
commands that directly change the status of the synchroni-
zation discretes and use these discretes in their logic.
The indirect-usuage modules invoke the direct-usage modules
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in order to achieve software synchronization through the
synchronization discretes. 	 As can	 be noted,	 these discretes
are used extensively by the software to operate the GPCs in
the Redundant and Common Sets in synchrony with each other
and minimize the data	 skew which exists	 because of the redun-
dant operation of the GPCs.
A synchronization	 discrete failure will	 cause the remov-
al	 of the GPC it is associated with from the Redundant and
Common Sets, even	 though the GPC may be functioning properly.
The outcome of this	 type of failure	 is	 the	 loss	 of a GPC,	 and
the crew	 is	 immediately notified of the	 synchronization fail-
ure through the Computer Annunciation Matrix. 	 Since the
synchronization discretes are used as often as	 300 times/sec-
ond by application programs,	 the failure of these discretes
is immediately observed.	 Also,	 since the SSIP and Fast-Cycle
Execution programs use synchronization at every 40 ms	 interval,
the upper bound on the time of detection of synchronization
discrete failures	 is	 approximately 20-30 ms.
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3.3 Redundancy Management Discrete Failures
The following modules can alter the state of redun-
dancy management discretes:
Module	 Page No. [5]	 Usage
FCMSVC	 3.3--93, Part 1	 Direct	 #
FCMFDI	 3.3-39, Part 1
	
Direct	 #
FCMVOTE	 3.2-83, Part 1*	 Direct.
FPMSVC	 3.1-2^ Part 1	 Indirect
FIOCMPLT	 3.2-129, Part 1	 Indirect
*Reference [71
The direct usage modules can change the status of
fail discretes that drive the Computer Annunciation Matrix.
The indirect usage modules invoke the direct-usage modules.
When a failure occurs on one of these discretes, the light
driven by the faulty discrete may be lit. However, this
may not have any undesirable consequences since the crew,
by observing the other three lights in the same raw, can
deduce whether the light is energized due to a discrete
failure or to a GPC failure. The situation with the GPC5
fail discrete is different; GPC5 performs self testing to
see whether it is functioning properly and is not involved
in cooperative testing. Thus, when the light connected
to the GPC5 fail discrete is energized, the crew may not
know whether this is due to a discrete -Failure or due to
the Backup Computer System failure. In this situation, the
consequences are dependent on the crew action. In the
worst case, the crew may assume the loss of Backup System
even though this system may be functional. Any failure on






3.4 Control and Indicator Discrete Failures
The GPC Standby/Run Command discretes are monitored
by the ARA GPC_ SWITCH module (Page 3.3--25, Part 3 [5]}
once per every second whereas the GPC Ready -indicator is
controlled by the AIC GPC STARTUP module (Page 3.1-15, Part
3 [51). The Halt indicator has hardware control on the GPC
operation and thus is not used in software logic. When a
Standby or Halt discrete is set erroneously due to transient
or permanent faults, the GPC stops participating actively in
computation and control of the space shuttle, thus resulting
in a GPC loss. Within seconds, the crew will be notified of
the loss of the GPC and its status, and thereafter the action
of the crew decides the consequences. The Run Command is
accepted by the GPC only when it has been initialized and is
in a Standby state. Thus, a Run Command discrete, when it
is set prematurely, may cause the GPC to start computation
before it is expected to do so. However, this should not
have any adverse consequences.
When the GPC IPL discrete is prematurely set false when
IPL is being performed, the crew may be under the impression
that the GPC is IPL'ed and ready to go. However, since the
IPL operation takes of the order of milliseconds, this type
of discrete failure does not cause any severe problems. The
IPL Activate discrete, if affected by transient failures,
also does not cause adverse problems. However, permanent
faults on these discretes mean the loss of the GPC and re-
duced computational power.
The I/O Active indicator discrete falls into the same
category as the preceding two, in that its transient failure
does not cause adverse consequences. If the discrete is
erroneously set true indicating that the IOP is ready to ac-
cept crew commands where, in actuality, this may not be so,
the crew may initiate commands which may be lost. Here again,
the resulting consequences depend on the crew interpretation
of the situation.
Transient errors on the I/O Terminate Command A and B
discretes can cause data path errors logged againt the
flight-critical buses. When this happens, the software mod-
ule FIOCTDPE is invoked to see if there is any change in the
status of the Standby/Halt or BFCS Engage switches. If
these switches do not indicate any changes and more than P
(nominally two) FC 1--4 or FC 5-8 data paths are masked, the
GPC forces itself to a synchronization failure and removes
itself from the Redundant Set. Whenever a data path is
masked due to an error, the data path error is annunciated
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to the user. Thus the net effect of I/O Terminate dis-
crete failures can be the loss of a GPC. The crew may
not be able to deduce whether the GPC loss is due to I/O
Terminate discrete failures or to the GPC failure.
The MM IPL Select Command discrete transient failures
can cause a wrong MM to be selected for IPL. These fail-
ures are not critical, and in the worst case the GPC will.
not be IPL'ed. Transient failures on the Mass Memory dis-
cretes have similar effects on the IPL of the GPC. Also,
the uplink/downlink capabilities to/from the MMUs will be
temporarily affected by the transient failures.
The BFCS Engage Command discrete, when set true erro-
neouly, can cause invocation of the software module FCMBMASK
and this may lead to data path masking. Thus a failure on
this discrete can cause the loss of GPC.
For the Backup Control System, any single transient
failure on the BFCS discretes does not cause the BFCS to be
engaged. The three BFCS Engage Commands and the IOP Termi-
nate Command B Inverse discrete are majority voted to
decide when the Backup System is to be engaged. The BFCS
Fail discrete failure can cause the crew to think that the
BFCS control unit is not operational whereas, in actuality,
this may not be so. As mentioned before, the GPC Fail indi-
cator discrete failure may misinform the crew as to the
operational status of the BFCS.
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3.5 Discrete Failure Analysis
In the preceding sections the effects of a fault on
each discrete is discussed individually; in the present
section this discussion is extended to transient and
permanent discrete failures and their effects on the
entire system. The discussion is summarized in Table 5,
which lists each discrete failure, transient and perma.-
vent, together with information regarding recoverability
from this failure and consequences in the worst case.
i
The redundancy management and synchronization discretes.
are used when the GPC is included in the Redundant Set and
hence permanent failures of any of these discretes imply
that the GPC cannot be used in a redundant computation.
On the other hand, the GPC can be used to-compute by.itself..
and thus these failures are not critical for self-operation..
Transient failures on the synchronization discretes result
in the loss of the GPC from the Common and Redundant Sets
as mentioned before in the previous sections; however the
GPC can be recovered by re-initialization. Transient failures
on the redundancy management discretes do not have any effects
on the DPS; however, if these failures are misinterpreted by
the crew, this may cause the loss of the GPC once again. The
GPC 5 Fail discrete, if it malfunctions due to a transient
error, can cause an alarm, and here again the resulting conse-
quences are decided by the crew action.
The control and indicator discretes are necessary for
proper operation of the GPC and permanent failure of any of
these discretes imply permanent loss of the GPC. Transient
errors on these discretes may or may not have an effect on the
system performance depending on the crew interpretation of
the situation. Thus if the IOP Indicator discrete fails for
a short time, the crew may attempt to use the GPC after awhile
or disable the GPC from further computation. If the IPL dis-
cretes are not functioning properly because of transient errors,
the crew may decide to try IPL repeatedly or once again remove
the CPC from computation.
The BFCS is designed so that transient and single errors
on the BFC5 discretes do not have any effect. The BFCS Engage
Command and I/O Terminate Command discretes are majority-voted
and tested for stability before any action is attempted. Thus
only multiple simultaneous faults which persist for over two
consecutive minor cycles can cause engagement of the BFCS. If
other GPCs are not properly disabled from their data buses
totally unpredictable consequences may ensue.
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Failure Effects and worst-Case Time of
Type Recoverability Consequence Detection
If the failure occurs 	 in the If the identification discrete Immediate, by
preinitialization phase on failure is not noticed on the observing the
Transient the ground, the failure can ground (which is unlikely)	 the displayed
be detected by monitoring entire DPS will	 be non-functional. status of the
the displays and recovered. GPCs.
If the failure occurs
Permanent after one-time initializa-
tion, no effect on the Sys-
tem.
Single transient errors do not
have any effects.	 Multiple
simultaneous transient errors Loss of a GPC depending on the
can cause disablement of creiq action. Immediate
Transient correctly operating GPCs by
the crew. A transient error on
the GPC 5 Fail	 discrete indicates ^
the 9FCS is not ready to take over,
Single permanent errors do not
have any effects.	 Multiple Loss of a GPC from the Redundant
Permanent errors lead to the loss of the Set. Immediate
GPC.	 The GPC can be operated
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removal of the avc from the umurv*eo are used
Transient Redundant and Common sotx ' Loss of a u,c from the Re- at uvo'v cn ms 1n-
The s pc can he recovered by ouno^nt and Common Sets. torvnl, in snIP and
forming a new Redundant Set.^ n,^ Cycle prncos	 `'	 !,
sor p ovsos and in
— sXu: as many times
' as xnn per second.
	 '.
The time of mm' 
Permanent errors imply that teotivo is 1m-
me svc cannot be vpw,utou mediate.
in o redundant moue;	 but m,, of n uPo from co-
Permanent it can be oyumtvu in u operative and redundant j.
oulv mode with self-testing computation. ^ 
to	 improve reliability.
Table 5	 (continued).	 Discrete failure analysis
`
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Discrete Failure 'Effects and Worst-Case Time of
Type Type Recoverability Consequence Detection
Transient errors on the GPC These Command dis-
Halt/Standby Command dis- cretes are moni-
cretes force an operating tored once a sec-
GPC into a Halt or Standby Forced termination of a cor- and and the status
Transient mode.	 Errors on Run Com- rectly operating GPC. of the GPCs	 is
nand discrete have an ef- ' displayed on moni-
fect only
	
in Standby mode. tors.	 Time of de-
The GPC can be recovered tection is	 imme-
GPC Halt/Standby/ by performing an	 TPL and diate.
Run Command placing	 it in	 proper made.
Discretes
Permanent errors	 have	 the Forced termination of a
same effect as transient correctly operating
Permanent errors.	 The GPC cannot be GPC and the permanent loss
recovered as in the of a GPC.
transient error case.
Table
	 5	 (continued).	 Discrete failure analysis
Discrete Failure Effects and Worst-Case Time of
Type Type Recoverability Consequence Detection
If the Ready Indicator comes
on prematurely while perform-
ing the	 IPL and the crew ini- Loss of a GPC because of the
tiates commands,	 the GPC may crew action.	 (This	 is	 unlikely
Transient not respond.	 To recover'from because	 IPL takes of order Immediate
this error,	 the crew should .5 — .75	 seconds.)
GPC Ready reinitiata their commands
Indicator instead of disabling the GPC.
Effects are the same as in the Permanent	 loss of a GPC--when
transient case.	 The GPC can- it is	 brought to the Halt Immediate
M Permanent not he brought to a Halt state state.
and	 reinitialized.
Transient errors on IPL dis-
Transient	 cretes cause improper 	 IPL.	 To Loss of a GPC depending on	 Immediate
recover from these errors IPL the crew action.
IPL Discretes	 has	 to	 be performed again.
Effects are the same as in the
transient case.	 Permanent er- Permanent loss of a GPC if
Permanent	 rors an	 IPL discretes imply it is brought to the Halt	 Immediate
that the GPC cannot be re-IPLed state.
i^ ^ properly.
O






Discrete Failure Effects and Worst-Case Time of
Type Type Recoverability Consequence Detection
A transient or permanent fail-
ure can cause an erroneous	 indi- Disablement of a GPC de-
cation that does not reflect the pending
	
an the	 crew action. Immediate
I/D Active Transient true status of the 	 IDP.	 Tran-
Indicator sient errors	 can be	 ignored Loss	 of a GPC.
Permanent but a permanent failure means Immediate





ment of data buses from the
Transient GPC	 and	 possibly its	 ultimate Loss of a GPC from the Re-
removal	 from the Redundant Set. dundant Common Sets.
The GPC can be recovered by re- Depends on data
I/D Terminate initialization and formation bus	 activity.	 In
Command of a new Redundant Set. all	 cases	 the	 de-
discretes tection will	 be
Permanent failures	 imply the Permanent loss of a GPC from immediate and with-
Permanent loss of the GPC from further further computation and in seconds.
computation. control.
Table 5 (continued). Discrete failure analysis
Loss of a GPC depending
on the crew action.	 Immediate in the
IPL phase. At
other times,
de p endent on
the frequency
Permanent loss of MMU(s)	 of MMU usage.
and possibly the entire
DPS.







Permanent loss of a GPC.	 within seconds.
Discrete Failure Effects and
Type Type Recoverability
Transient faults	 can cause	 IPL
not to be performed properly in
Transient the	 1PL phase.	 Transactions	 in-
volving MMUs may not be com-
Mass Memory pleted properly.	 The MMUs	 can
Discretes be	 recovered by re-tries.
a'
Same	 as	 in the transient case.
Permanent failures imply
Permanent the loss of MMU(s)	 and soft-
ware modules and consequently
the	 entire	 DPS.
Transient	 failures	 can cause
disablement of data buses from








Effects	 are the	 same as	 in	 the
transient case,	 The GPC can-
Permanent not be recovered from this




Table 5 (continued). Discrete failure analysis.
Discrete Failure Effects and WDrst-Case Time of
Type Type Recoverability Consequence Detection
Only multiple simultaneous
transients that last for
Transient two minor cycles on these
BFCS Engage discretes can have an
and I/D Terminate effect. Engagement	 (or dis-
Command Discretes engagement) of	 -
A single permanent failure BFCS. Immediate
Cn does not have any effect.
00 Permanent Multiple	 failures can cause
unreliable and unpredictable
DPS performance.
Transient failures can be Immediate
Transient ignored since they do not
have any effect on the DPS.
BFCS Fail
A permanent failure means Loss of BFCS. Immediate
Permanent that the BFCS is not opera-
tional.




4. PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF DISCRETE FAILURES
In this chapter, a probabilistic analysis of dis-
crete failures is given. The anlysis is necessarily limited
because of the lack of detailed information regarding the
circuit and component reliabilities. An exponential failure
law is assumed in the analysis throughout.
4.1 Identification Failures
Identification failures will be due either to the iden-
tification discrete failures or to the core memory location
failures. Since the former type of failure is detectable
on the ground and thus correctable, only core memory fail-
ures will be considered in the following.
	 (Although the
scope of the present Contract covers only the effects of
discrete failures, the criticality of the situation necessi-
tates the consideration of core memory failures). Each core
-a t
elementfollows the reliability law R c = e c where 1/X c is
the mean life of the element. The identification numbers of
the four primary GPCs can be changed or misread due to the
unreliable operation of core elements. For simplicity of
analysis, it is assumed that once this happens, catastrophy
ensues because of the resulting conflicts for data buses.
(The software can possibly detect certain identification num-
ber errors, such as the number being equal to 000 or greater
than 100). Then the probability P c of obtaining correct
identification numbers can be given as
-I2act
P c - e
	 (1)
and the mean time to the catastrophic error as
T c = .0833/ X c 	(2)
The probability of catastrophic error can be minimized
by using a redundant or coding approach. In the redundant
approach each identification number is stored in three memory
locations and majority voting is performed to obtain the cor-
rect identification number, assuming as before a failure rate
of h e for each core element. The probability that the correct
identification number is generated is
*In the following the term core element refers to the magnetic
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 - 2e	 c
The probability of catastrophic failure occurrence due to
identification number error can now be determined as
--24^ t	 --2tA t
PG 	 ^R c (t}^'^ = 81e	 c -- 216e	 c
-30Xt	 -33X t	 -36A t
+ 216e	 c - 96e
	
c + 16e	 c	 (3)
The following coding approach may also be used to
reduce system unreliability. Assume that six bits are assigned
(instead of three) for each identification number in the
following manner:
GPC1 00 00 00
GPC2 01 01 01
GPC3 10 10 10
GPC4 11 11 11
i
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Each identification number is at least three units
i	 of distance from other identification numbers and hence
.y	 this coding can correct one and detect two core element
failures in each identification number location. The
probability of identification numbers being correct can be
derived as
pcor - pc + 6p c
(1--p C ) + 3p^{1-pc)24
i
81p^ 6 - 216p^ 8 + 216p 0 - 96pG 2 + 16p4.
t	 Assuming p to be exponential as before, the reliability of
correct gerrieration of identification numbers can be found as
-167 t	 18A t	 --20A t





The failure rate for the entire 64K x 36-bit-GPC memory
is approximately 500 failures/million hours.* Assuming that
when a core element fails, it is due to the read/write
amplifier circuitry, A C can be determined approximately as
.75 failures/10 6 hours. When A c t is small,
P c	 1--12A c t	 (1' )
P ,	 1--108(XCt)2	 3 )
P H = 1-48(X t)2	 (4'J
*Private communication from Mr. Paul Sollock of NASA--JSC.
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It follows that the unreliabilities can be given as
QC = 1--P C T 12X c t (5)
Qt = 1-P I 108(X c t) 2 ( b)
Q^ = 1-P"	 w 48(A c t) 2 (7)
The improvements in system reliability using the redundant
and coding approaches can be given as
FR = Qc/Qc = 1/ 9 (x c t ) 2	(8)
FG = Q c /Q^ = 1/4(a c t) 2	(9)
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show P c , P' and PH for X c = 10 - 7`,
2x10 - 7 , 5x10 - 7 and 10
-5
 failures/hour as t varies from
.15 to 2.1 hours, whereas Figure 4.3 shows the improvements
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4.2 Effects of Discrete Failures on	 Y
System . Reliabili ty
In this'section, a quantitative analysis of the
effects of discrete failures on the entire system relia--
bility is attempted. The mission duration time, during
which the Primary Control System is effective, is estab-
lished.
The following effective failure rates are assumed
for the SOP discretes: 	 f
Discretes	 Effective Failure Rate
R d d


























1TMMiS ` x Mmi
7rMMIR X MMi R
?f BFCE ?LBFCE
The value of -ff for a given discrete can be chosen I or 0
depending on whether a fault on this discrete causes the crew
to remove the GPC associated with it. Thus if the IPL Indicator
discrete fails but the crew chooses to ignore it 
uGPCI 
can be set
to 0. The failure rate for each GPC is
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g	 XGPC Discrete	 Discrete	 Discrete
where Discrete runs through all the discretes listed above.
The probability of correct operati.on of the DPS
can be given as-






( ,_p c ) 2
 + P,. l--	p2 ( i - p c) e	 a
where p
c 
and p B are the probabilities that the primary and
backup systems are working properly. Assuming a failure 	 r:
rate of X g for the Backup System, one has for the reliability




Rc (t) q6 e	 e	 1-e	 }
+ e-^St	 3
3	
2XGPCt	 -4?, t	 -(2xCPC + 
^L
6e	 - 6e	 -- 6e
4x GPC +1 a3 )t	 ^X t
+ 6e	 + e




} T - 3	 _	 12AGPC	 1
c	 2XGPC	 2XGPC+ 
AB 4X
GPC IA B 	
f	 '
Letting F = xGPC/hB, T G becomes
i
Tc	 1	 16P 3 +24 p2 +20p^ 3	 f
^GPC
	 16P +1
In determine AGPC, the value of Tr for a given dis-
crete can be chosen 1 or 0, depending on whether a fault
on this discrete causes the crew to remove the GPC associ-
ated with it. Thus if the IPL Indicator discrete fails
but the crew chooses to ignore it, 7Tcan be set to 0.
The unreliability of the entire DPS, Q c (t) is shown
in Figures 4--4 through 4--7. The values of XGPC are select-
ed to be 100, 200, 500 and 1000 Failures/10 6
 hours and p
varies from 1 to 100. Figure 4-8 shows the variation of
successful mission time with respect to the ratio 
Tc IT GPC
where 
TGPC	 1/XGPC'	 It is interesting to note that this
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w	 igure 4--5.	 D P S unreliability versus time in
J ----	 {	 hours for XGPC=200 failures/ 6 hrs. }
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Based on the investigation carried out under this
contract, the ^ollowing recommendations are made to
improve the reliability of the DPS.
Z) Because of the critical nature of identification
failures, it is strongly recommended that the
software design incorporate coding and/or re-
dundant approaches in accessing identification
numbers from the core memory. These approaches
not only prevent catastrophic failures occurring
due to single core element failures but also de-
tect when a correct identification number is
generated. Such.detection can be used to in-
-Form the GPCs to turn themselves off instead
of creating interferences on data buses.
2) The synchronization discretes are used at rates
of 300/second and because of their vital importance
in keeping the computer systems in synchrony, it
is strongly suggested that hardware redundancy be
incorporated in these discretes. Though software
to support synchronization discrete redundancy is
a possibility, this does not appear to be a practi-
cal solution in view of the rates at which these
discretes are used. It is recommended that each
synchronization discrete be triplicated with major-
ity voting and possibly a spare discrete.	 (There
are many spare discretes that are not used in the
IOP 40/32 discretes.)
3) After a careful review of the other discretes and
the manner they are incorporated into the system de-
sign, it is concluded that no further significant
improvements can be made to the existing design.
The present design requirements and implementations
support direct/indirect monitoring of the status of
the discretes that makes it possible to detect mal-
functions. The crew, by observing the information
displayed, can deduce the operational status of
the discretes such as the Halt/Standby Run dis-
cretes, IPL discretes, etc.
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The following tests are recommended -to test and im-
prove the reliability of the space shuttle:
1) Test the reliability of the synchronization
discretes and evaluate their failure rates.
Simulate the situation, by means of software,
where one or more synchronization discretes
fail in each GPC and determine the consequences.
Check whether the crew can successfully switch
the control to the Backup System within safe
time limits.
2) Simulate core memory failures to generate wrong
identification numbers and determine the conse-
quences. Pest whether the crew can detect the
malfunction of the DPS and develop a list of
symptoms that the crew can observe to detect
Identification number failures.
3) Conduct experiments on the discrete circuits to
determine the failure rates of the IOP discretes
so that the failure rate of the entire DPS due
to discrete failures can be determined.
4) Determine the rate of transient synchronization
failures by observing the number of retries
attempted at each synchronization point.
5) Simulate faults (permanent or transient) on the
control and indicator discretes and determine
the crew's reaction to these faults. Develop
a list of actions that the crew should perform
when these faults are abserved in flight.
6) Determine the ratio A GPC' A B and see whether AB




This report presented an analysis of the effects of
discrete -Failures on the Data Processing Subsystem. The
analysis included a functional description of each discrete
together with a list of software modules that use this dis-
crete. A qualitative description of the consequences that
may ensue due to discrete failures is given followed by a
probabilistic reliability analysis of the Data Processing
Subsystem. Rased on the investigation conducted, recom-
mendations were made to improve the reliability of the
subsystem.
In the following, some methods are suggested for
recovering GPCs lost because of synchronization as well
as other discrete failures. Since in the ALT phase no
attempts are made Lo recover the lost GPCs, these methods
are applicable only in the OFT phase. Rollback and roll_
forward techniques can be profitably used to recover GPCs
out of synchrony and include them in Redundant or Common
Set computation. In the rollback technique, whenever a
GPC is lost from the Redundant or Common Set due to tran-
sient errors, during the SSIP phase all the GPCs reset
their status to a common reference point in the past whose
status has been stored either in Mass Memory units or GPC
memory, and resume their computation. This technique
slows down computation rates and is preferred only when
speed is not critical.	 In the roll-forward technique,
when a GPC fails due to synchronization, instead of remov-
ing the GPC from the Redundant or Common Set, the correct-
ly operating GPCs transmit their status and data to this
GPC, and then all the GPCs resume their computation. This
technique also has the advantage of recovering the GPCs
lost due to transient errors, and is faster. These tech-
niques can be easily incorporated in the present software
design of the space shuttle to increase the reliability
of the Redundant and Common Sets.
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A	 — LEFT INPUT TO ALU
AEP	 — ATTITUDE AND POINTING
A/A	 AIR TO AIR
j A/C	 — AIRCRAFT
A/D	 — ANALDG—TO—DIGITAL
A/L	 — APPROACH AND LANDING
AA	 — ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
ACC	 — ACCUMULATOR
ACE	 — ACCEPTANCE CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT




ADS	 — AUXILIARY MEMORY DATA UUTPUT BUS
ADC
	
— ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
ADC	 — AIR DATA COMPUTER
ADI
	 — ATTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATOR
ADI.	 — AVIONICS DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY
ADP	 — AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
t ADS	 — AaR DATA SYSTEM .
f ADT
	
-- AIR DATA TRANSDUCER
ADTA	 — AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
i ADVANCE	 — MEMORY DATA AVAILABLE SIGNAL
AGE	 — AIR/GROUND EQUIPMENT
AHP	 -- PITCH AXIS ATTITUDE BOLD
Al	 — ALTITUDE INDICATOR
AIB—GPC—LOCATOR	 GPC LOCATOR (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE:)
AIC
—GPC—STARTUP	 GPC STARTUP (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
t AID	 -- ANALOG INPUT D1FFEhENTIAL
I AIE_,SIP	 SYSTEM INTERFACE PROCESSOR (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
? AIG—DEU_,LOAUER
	
DEU LOADER (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
I AIU
	 — AVIONICS INTERFACE UNIT
ALC	 — AUTOMATIC LIGHT CONTROL
ALPHA
	 - ANGLE OF ATTACK
! ALT	 — APPROACH AND LANDING TE:SI
ALU	 -- ARITHMETIC/LOGIC UNIT
AMEC	 — AFT MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER
AMI	 — ALPHA/MACH CONTROLLER
AMI	 — AIRSPEED /MALH INDICATORS
i AHT	 - APPLICATIONS MUDIN6 TABLE
AN	 — ALPHANUMERIC
ADA	 — ANGLE OF ATTACK
AOD	 — ANALOG OUTPUT DIFFERLNIIAL
APP	 — APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE
A. lu	 — AUXILIARY POWER UNIT
APV	 -- ATTACH POINT VOLTAGE
ARA—GPC^SWITCH	 GPC SWITCH MONITOR (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
ARB-10 LE_OPS	 IDLE UPERATIDNAL SEQUENCE (SYSTE:?I CONTROL MODULE)
ARC—GPC—RECONFIG	 6PC RECDNF16URATI qN (SVSTEN CONTROL MODULE)
ARu—BUS,CHG	 BUS CONFIGURArIDN CHANGE (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
ARE—GPC—TABLE—LHG 	 GPC RECONFI60RATION TABLE CHANGE (SYSTEM CONTROL. MODULE)
ARF—DPS—CONF16—ITEM	 UPS CONFIGURATION ITEM PROCESSOR (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
i ARG—RECONFIG—MSG	 GPC RECONFIGURATION MESSAGE HANDLER (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
ARH—SEC—uPC—FCECONf-IG	 StCONDARY GPC RECUNFIGURATION ISYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
ASA
	 — AEROSURFACE SERVO AMPLIFIER ASSEMBLY
ASA
—IOLE_,SPEL	 IDLE SPECIALIST FUNCTION -- SPEC 0-00 (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULI)
I A56—RD/WRT	 READ/KRITE: SPECIALIST FUNCTION (SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE)
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iASC—TINE
-- QGKT	 TIME MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST FUNCTION (SYSTEM CONTROL KDOULE)
ASD—DATA—CONTROL
	 DATA CONTROL SPECIALIST FUNCTION (SYSTEM CONTROL MOOULE}
ASLCN
— AUXILIARY SELECT SIGNAL
ASI
— AIRSPEED INDICATOR




— AEROSURFACE POSITION INDICATOR
ATA — AVIONICS TEST ARTICLE
ATP — ACTIVATION TEST PROGRAM
ATVCD •— ASCENT THRUST VECTOR CONTROL DRIVER
AVVI.
— ALTITUDE VERTICAL VELOCITY INDICATOR
B*
— RIGHT INPUT TO ALU
BA
— BOUNDARY ALIGNMENT




— BUS CONTROL ELEMENT (IN IOP)
BCH — ROSE, CHAUDHURI, AND HOCQUENGHEM
BCL
— BIT COUNT LATCHED (MIA SIGNAL)
BCHUX
— BUS CONTROL MULTIPLEXER
BCPTN
-- EXTERNAL MEMORY ADDRESS PARITY ERROR SIGNAL
BODSN•
— SCE DISABLE DISCRETE
BONI — BEARING AND DISTANCE HEADING INDICATOR
BETA
-° ANGLE OF SIDE SLIP
BFC
— BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROL
BFCS — BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
BFCSED
— BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROL ENGAGE DISCRETE
BIT — BUILT—IN TEST
BITE — BUILT--IN TEST EQUIPMENT
BRAS — BODY MOUNTED ACCELEROMETER SYSTEM
i	 BOF — BEGINNING OF FILE
ROT BEGINNING OF TAPE
BP — "READY„ RESET
BPS
— BIT PER SECOND
BR
— BRANCH
SSR — BRANCH SECTOR REGISTER
BSR — SITE STATUS REGISTER
SSR
— BRANCH SECTOR REGISTER
°	 SSYN
1
— MEMORY BUSY SIGNAL
BTE
— BTU ERROR TABLE
OTCs — BLOCK TIME OUT
BTU
— SUS TERMINAL JNIT
BU — BRANCH UNCONOITIONAL
BU -- BACKUP
BUN
-- BITE UPDATE NOTICE
BUOU
— BACKUP OPTICAL UNIT
BUSY




-- COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
C&4(
— CAUTION AND WARNING
C—BUS
— COMPUTER DATA BUS
CI.H — CONTROL MONITOR
C/T
-- CONTROL AND TIRING
C/W
-- CAUTION AND WARNING
CAB
-- COMPUTER ADDRESS SIT
CAB
-- COMPUTER ADDRESS BUS
CADE
— CONTROLLER/ATTITUDE DIREL.TUR ELECTRONICS
95
CALC — CALCULATE
CAH — COMPUTER ANNUNCIATION MATRIX
CAPRI. — CAPACITOR RESET INTbGRATOkt
CAPRI -- CAPACITOR RATE INTEGRATOR
CARR — CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE READINESS REVIEW
CAS -- COMMAND AUGMENTATION SYSIEH
CC — CROSS--COUPLEE	
CC — CHANNEL CONTROLLER
CL -- COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL
CCAT -- CMPTR/CRT ASSIGNMENT TABLE
CCD -- CONSTANTS CHANGE DISPLAY
CCP — COMMAND COMPUTER (?)
CCR - CROSS--COUPLE REGISTER
CCT -- CUR-RENT CONFIGURATION TABLE
CCTV — CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION
CD — COMMAND DECODER MD M
GDS -- COMPUTER DATA GUS
CDD -- cowrIGUOUS +BATA DESCRIPTOR TABLE
CDR — COMMANDER
CDR — COMMAND DESIGN REVIEW
CDW - COMMAND DATA WORD
CG — CENTER OF GRAVITY
CGD — CYCLIC GROUP DESCRIPTOR
CI — CONFIGURATION INSPECTION
CE — CREW INTERFACE
CIA — CONTROL INTERFACE ASSEMhLY
CIA — COMPUTER INTERFACE ADAPTER
CM — CONTROL MONITOR
CM — CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
GKD — COMMAND
CNfOS — COMPLEMENTARY METAL—OXIDE—SEMICONDUCTOR
CMPTR -- COMPUTER'
COMPOOL -- COMMON DATA POOL AREA
COMSEC — COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
f	 CONTN — CONTINUE SIGNAL
CP — CLOCK PULSE
i	 CPDS — COMPUTER PROGRAM UEVELOPEKENT SPECIFICATION
CPEI — COMPUTER PROGRAM END ITEM
CPU — CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT
CPUFN — CPU FAIL SIGNAL
3	 CPUPR — CPU PRIORITY FOR BUS ACCESS
',I CR — CARD READER
CRT -- CATHODE RAY TUBE (IN DU)
CS — CREW STATION
CSE — COMPUTER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
CSECT — CONTROL SECTION
CSN — CHANNEL SELECT NOT [SIGNAL 10 MIA)
CSS — CONTROL STICK STEERING
CTS — COMPUTER TEST SET
CVT — COMMUNICATION VECTOR TABLE
CW — CONTROL WORD
CW — COMMAND WORD
CWEU — CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT
D -- DISCRETE
D&C — DISPLAY AND CONTROL
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4^Y	 ^+aR	 — DISPLAY INITIATIUN AND RESPONSE
DIA
	 — DIGITAL TO ANALUG
u/C	 — DISPLAY AND CONTROL
i DACoU	
— DIGITAL ACQUISITIUN AND CONTROL BUFFER UNIT (PCM MASTER)
! DAP
	
-- DIGITAL AUTO PILOT
,)6	 — DATA BUFFER
D6	 — DATA BUS
ubc	 -- DATA BUS COUPLER
DBG	 — DATA BUS GROUP
ObI
	 — DATA E3US INTERFACE UNIT — LAUNCH
UdIA	 — DATA BUS ISOLATION AMPLIFIER
DBN	
— DATA BUS NETWORK
OC	 — DISPLAY COUPLER
+ DCO—DOWNLIST
	 GPC DOWNLIST FuRMATTER (USER INTERFACE KODULE)
JCI_CDt4_UATA
	 DATA CUNVERSION (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
DGi—LYL_DISPLAY
	 CYCLIC DISPLAY PROCESSING (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
UCI_FMT_OATA	 DATA FORMATTING (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
0CM
	 DISPLAY AND CONTROL MODULE




— UEDICAIED DISPLAY & CONTROL SYSTEMS
ODL_oWN_LST_L0NTROLS	 GPC OOkNLIST DATA CONTROLS PROCESSOR (UIM)
DUOU
	 — DISPLAY DECODER DRIVER UNIT
DOI	
— oISCRETE DIGITAL INPUTS
DOM	 — DATA DISPLA: MODULE
DOMAN
	
— DISABLE DMA SIGNAL
DDia	
— DISCRETE DIGITAL OUTPUT
i]DS
	 — DETAIL UESIL^? SPECIFICATION
DDU
	
— DIGITAL DISPLAY UNIT
'JOU
	 — DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
DEG	 -- DEGREES
DET
	 — DIGITAL EVENT TIMER
r,	
uEU	
— DISPLAY ELECTRONICS UNIT (IN MC.DS)
dF	 — DATA FLOW
OFB	
-- DISPLAY FORMAT BUFFER
uF1
	
— DEVELOPEMENT FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION
OFT	
— MISPLAY FORMAT TABLES
OGI_LOB-10	 LDS 1/0 PROCESSOR (USER INTERFACE MODULE)




— DISCRETE I/O REGISTER (OF 6PC)
DIH	
— DISCRE=TE INPUT HIGH
uIL	
-- DISCRETE INPUT LOW





— UISPLAY INITIAL PROGRAM LOAD
DISPLAY
	 DISPLAY PRE=SENTATION AND CONTROL (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
OISP	
— DISPLACEMENT
DISP	 — DISPLAY FUNCTION
DIT	
— DEU INPUT TABLE
DLC	
— UATA LOAD CLOCK
OLC	
— DELAY LINE_ CONTROL
DLCN	
— uATA LOAD CLOCK (TO LOAD SDR)
uLM_LD5_ROU T	 LOS: MESSAGE ROUTER (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
i+LT	




#J} DM	 -- DIODE MATRIX
DMA
	
-- DIRECT fiEMORY ACCESS
DYAIN
	
- DMA REQUEST SIGNAL
AMC-APP-I14T	 APPLICATION CONTROL INTERFACE (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
OMC-MCDS-CNT
	
MCDS DISPLAY CONTROL tUSER INTERFACE MODULE)
0MC NEW_DISPLAY
	
NEW DISPLAY PROCESSING (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
DMG-SEQ
-RLu-PROC	 SEQUENCE REQUEST PROCESSING (USER INTERFACE MODULE).
DMC-SUPER
	
USER INTERFACE CONTROL SUPERVISOR (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
DME	 - DISTANCE MEASURING EQUIPMENT
OtiE,_ICC ROUT
	
ICC MESSAGE ROUTER (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
DMI-MCDS-IN	 MCDS INPUT PROCESSOR (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
f OMM-KCUS PROCESS	 MCDS MESSAGE PROCESSOR : .(USER INTERFACE MODULE)
1OMMD
	 - DISPLAY FORMAT MASS MEMORY DIRECTORY
OMP_"_MSG_PROC	 MASS MEKORY HESSAGE PROCESSOR (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
jEiMS	 - DOCKING MODULE SUBSYSTEM
iDMS-MSG_,LSF
	
'MESSAGE LINE SUPPORT FUNCTION (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
UNX-BMS	 APPLICATION KODING AND SEQUENCING (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
DO	 -- DISCRETE OUTPUT
; ODD	 - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOL - DISCRETE OUTPUT LOW
^DPES - DATA PROCESSING AND SOFTWARE
DPDC - DOWNLIST PARAMETER DUMP CONTROL TABLE
^DPE - DATA PATH ERROR TABLE
i DPti -- uATA PATH MASK TABLE
iDPS --DATA PROCESSING SUBSYSTEM OR DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
,UR -- DATA REGISTER
{ DRO	 -- DESTRUCTIVE READOUT
^USELN
	
- DELAYED SELECT SIGNAL
DSKY	 - DISPLAY AND KEYBOARD
DStt	 -
 -DATA SECTOR REGISTER
;Usk	 - DATA SECTOR REGISTER
D TACN	 - DATA ACKNOWLEDGE SIGNAL
^UTH-TIME-HOMO	 TIME HOMOGENEOUS DATA REQUEST PROCESSOR (USER INTERFACE MODULE)
iOTRQN	 - DATA REQUEST SIGNAL
!DTS
	
- DATA TRANSFER SYSTEM
;DTVC	 - DATA TRANSMISSION AND VERIFICATION CONVERTER
,DU	 - DISPLAY UNIT (IN MCDS)
AWIH	 - MICRO ASSIST HARDWAREE	
- SOURCE (MEMORY DRIVER)
,En	 - SOURCEISINK (MEMORY DRIVER)
jE/W
	 - ENERGY TO WEIGHT RATIO
EA	 - EFFECTIVE ADDRESS
4 EACFM	 - ENGAGE ACTUATOR COMMAND FADING MODULE
}EACGM
	 - ELEVON ACTUATOR COMMAND GtNERATION MODULE




	 -- EARTH CENTEREU INERT1ALS
;ELLSS	 - ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
ECRV	 - EXPONENTIALLY CORRELATED RANDOM VARIABLES
'EDU	 - EXTERNAL DATA BUS
^EH	 - ERROR HANDLING
LIU	 - EN61NE: INTERFACE UNIT
l EMI	 - ELECTROMAGNETIC. INTERFERENCE




EOF - END DF FILL
tUR - END OF REFRESH
LOT - END OF TAPE
EUWN - tND OF WORD NOT (SIGNAL FROIA MIA TO LRU)
EP/MCM - EXTENDED PERFORMANCE/MODULAR CORE MEMORY
is S - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEH
EttE - EVENT QUEUE ELEMENT
ET - EXTERNAL TANK
ET - ELAPSED TIME
E'E' - ELAPSED TIML
ETI -- ELAPSED TIME INDICATOR
EU -- ENbINEERING UNIT
E - ELECTRONICS UNIT
EVA - EXTRAVLHiCULAR ACTIVITY
EXkC - EXECUTE-
EXEC - tXeCUTiVE
EXTFR - EXTERNAL PRIORITY FOR BUS ACCESS
F - FLi1ATING POINT
FA - I-LIGHT AFT
FAA - FALSE ALARM AVOIDANCE;
FAIN - FIRST ARTICLE CONFIGURATION INSPECTION
FAT - FLIGHT ATTITUDE- TABLE
FL - FLIGHI CONTROL.
Fc - FLIGHT COMPUTER
FCHL - FLIGHT CONTROL HYDRAULICS LABORATORY
FCMASYNL -- INITIAL SSIP SYNCHRONIZATION (FCOS MODULE:)
FCMBLEMD - USER MOUIFILATION OF bLE CHAINS TFCOS MODULE)
FCMBMIAN - UStg/GROUND REwUESTtU RECUNFI I URATION (FCOS MODULE)
f-LMuMASK - dUS/UAIA PATH MASK MANAGEMENT (FCOS MODULE)
FLMBUSLM USER /6ROUNU RLQUESTEU RECONFIGURATION (FCOS MODULE:)
FCMCSYNG - NORMAL SSIP SYNCHRONIZATION IFCOS MODULE)
FLMEUISAh - u1SABLE TKANSMITTEK RELLIVLK SUBROUTINE
FCMDIS7k -- DISABL: TRANS14ITTER SUBROUTINE
FCMGSSTK - UISAbLE STRINU SUbKUU71Nc
FCMENRCV - LNAoLt RE=CEIVER SUE;ROUTINt
FCMEIYSIR - '.NABLE STR1NU SUBROUTINL
FCMtENTK - LNABLL• TRANSMITTt:R SUBROUTINE
FGMFOI - FAULT ULTECTIUN IDLuTIFIi.ATION (FCf]S MODULE)
FCtiltvMMMC - RtAU tzLUCK FROM MM ROUTINE
i-LMINSSL -- SYSTtIi SOFTWARE LUAULK (FCUS MODULE}
FCMISYNC - I/O SYNCHRONIZATION IFCOS MODULE)
FCMLINIT -- UNE TIME INITIALIZATION TIOUTINE
FLAMUSTR - MODE STRING SUL-RUU7INE
FLMMt.PM - MEC-LIU PORT MANAGEMENT SUBRUUTINE
FCMNINIT - NORMAL INITIALIZATION (FLUS MODULE)
Fi-MPINIT
- POWER TPANSIENI IN111ALIZATION	 (FCOS MODULE)
FLMPMOU - PR06KAM MOUIFICATION (FCOS MODULE)
FCMPOVLY - PROGRAM f]VtIILAY (FCUS MODULE)
FLMRELST - RELE=ASE STRINGS SUBROUTINk
FCnSAICN - NOMINAL STRING ASSIGNMENT SUBROUTINE
FLMSFAIL - SYNL FAIL PROCESSOR (FCOS MODULE)
FCMSSYNG - SVC SYNCHRONIZATION (FCOS MODULE)
FLMSVC - CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT SVL SERVICING (FCUS MODULE)
FCMTSYNG - TIMER SYNCHNCNIZATIUN IFL4S MODULE)
























































FLIGHT CuNThOL OPERATIONAL SOFTWARE
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
FLIGHT CONTROL SUBROUTINE MODULE




FAULT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
FAULT DETECTION IDENTIFICATION AND RECOVERY
FREQUENCY DIVISION MULTIPLEXLR
FUNCTIONAL DESIGN SPECIFICATION








COMPLETION PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
COUNT DATA PATH ERROR P ROCEDURE
1/0 ERROR HANDLER, LEVEL A (FCOS MODULE)
I/q ERROR HANDLER, LEVEL B (FCOS MODULE)
I/O ERROR HANDLER, LEVEL C (FCOS MODULE)
LRROR COMPLETION SUBROUTINE
MASS MEMORY HALT PROCESSOR (FCOS MODULE)
ICC FAILURE SUbROUTINE
I/q ERROR LOG. PROGRAM IFCOS MODULE)
MSC 110 -MONITOR ENTRY POINT
MSC 1/0 MONITOR ENTRY POINT
MSC CONTROL PROGRAM (FCOS MODULE)
HM COMPLETION PROCESSING SUBROUTINE
CHECKSUK VERIFICATION SUBROUTINE
MM INITIATE REQUEST SUBROUTINE
MASS MEMORY MANAGEMENT ROUTINE (FCOS MODULE)
MASS MEMORY MSG ROUTINE (FCdS MODULE)
MM PROCESS INCOMING IOQE'S SUBROUTINE
MM ATTEMPT TO START REgUEST SUBROUTINE
MH MONITOR. OUTSTANDING REQUESTS SUBROUTINE
MM BUILD AND CHAIN TQE SUBROUTINE
MSC I/O MONITOR PROGRAM (FCOS NODULE)
MSC PSEUDO BUSY PROGRAM (FCOS-MODULE)
MSC I/O MONITOR ENTRY POINT
MSC TIMEOUT PROCEDURE .
MSC 8CE RESET PROGRAM (FCOS NODULE)
SET FAIL DISCRETES PROGRAH (FCOS NODULE)
NORMAL COMPLETION SUBROUTINE
LOP DISPATCHING (FCOS MODULE)
PROTECTED TRANSACTION SUBROUTINE
MSC PSEUDO TIHEGUT PROCEDURE
TEKMINATION PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
IFIF RESET PROCEDURE
H;'%^,S MEMORY CONTENTION RESOLUTION ROUTINE (FCOS MODULE)
1/0 SVC SERVICING (FCOS MODULE)





























































-- FLIGHT LOG RECORDER
FREQUENCY MDOULATION
— FORWARD MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER
— FAIL OPERATIONALIFAIL SAFE
— FIRST OPERATIONAL FLIGHT
— FIELD OF VIEW
— FIXED POINT
— FLOATING POINT
--CANCEL PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
— CLOSE PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
-- PROCESS DISPATCHING (FCOS MODULE)
— ERROR LOGGING (FCOS MODULE)
— EVENT EVALUATOR (FCOS MODULE)
— EVENT OEQUEUE PROCESSING (FCOS MODULI';)
— EVENT QUEUE GENERATION (FCOS MODULE)
FORCED CLOSE PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
-- INHIBIT/ENASLE APPLICATION PROCESSES (FCOS MODULE)
— INSTRUC'TIOk MONITOR INTERRUPT HANDLER (FCOS MODULE)
— XACHINE CHECK INTERRUPT HANDLER (FCOS MODULE)
— TIMER QUEUE ELEMENT EXPIRATION (FCOS MODULE)
— PROGRAM INTERRUPT HANDLER (FCOS MODULE)
-- MTU REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT ( FCOS MODULE)
— OPS CANCEL PROCESSING iFCOS MODULE)
-- RELEASE RESOURCE LOCK (FCOS MODULE)
-- RESERVE RESOURCE LOCK (FCOS MODULE)
— SET EVENT STATE TO FALSE (FCUS MODULE)
PROCESS SCHEDULING (FCOS NODULE)
-•- PROCESS-ERROR RECOVERY (FCOS MODULE),
-- SET- EVENT- STATE-TO. TRUE._(FCOS MODULE)
-- PULSE EVENT STATE (FCOS MODULE)
— PRIO FUNCTION (FCOS MODULE)
— APPLICATION..ERROR NUMBER RL• QUEST (FCOS MODULE)
-- SVC HANDLING ( FCOS :AODULE)
-- PROCESS SWITCHING (FCOS MODULE)
— TERMINATE PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
TIMER.DEQUEUE PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)
TIME QUEUE GENERATION (FCOS MODULE)
-- APPL.ICATIONS.REQUESTS FOR TIME AND DATE (FCOS MODULE)
--NASTER TIMING UNIT UPDATES (FCOS MODULE)
— UPDATE PRIORITY FUNCTION (FCOS MODULE â
WAIT PROCESSING (FCOS MODULE)





-- FAULT SUMMARY JPAGE
FLIGHT SOFTWARE READINESS REVIEW
-- FUNCTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
FLIGHT SOFTWARE-PACKAGE
















GLN - GUIOANCE AND NAVIbATIUN
GC - GENERAL COMPUTER
GCNN -- GATE COMMAND WORD SIGNAL
GLKON - GATED LOCKOUT SIGNAL (IPL MOUE)
GMT -- taRESNWICH MEAN TIME
I	 bNSC - GUIBANCE T NAVIGATION ANU CONTROL
GNU - GROUNU
(,PC - GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (CPU AND I0P)
! GPT£ - GENERAL PURPOSE TEST Et4UIPMENT
i b p IN - GRANT PRIORITY 1 TU DMA
RUN - [,ATE TRI--STATE URIVERS SIGNAL
GRT -- (CPC RECONFIGURATION TABLE
GSE - GROUND SUPPOKT EQUIPMkNT
C GSiU -- GROUND STANDARD INTERFACE UNIT
I GST - 6PC STATUS TABLE
i H/N - HARDWARE
1 HAC - HEADING ALIGNMEK7 CYLINDER
HAL/S - PROGRAMMINGILANGUAGE
HFT - HORIZONTAL FLIGHT TEST
HGA - HIGH GAIN ANTENNA
HSI •-- HORIZONTAL SITUATION INUI.CATION
r45P -- t-IYURAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE
nW - HALFNORD
1	 I - SINK (MEMORY DRIVER)
I/U - INPUT/OUTPUT
IA -- INUIRECT ADDRESS
IA -- INPUT AXIS
IAS - INDICATED AIRSPEED
iiicmux - INNER BUS CONTROL MULTIPLLXER
IbM - INTER14ATIONAL BUSINESS KACHINES
IC - INSTRUCTION COUNTER
ICC -- INTERCOMPUTL? COMMUNICATIONS
1LC - INTERC OMPUTER CHANNEL
ICC -- INTER-COMPUTER CHANNEL (FCOS MODULE)
ILL) - INTERFACE CONTROL UDCUMENT
ID -	 INSIUE DIAMETER
IU - IUENTIFICATION NUMBER
IUp5
- INTERFACE DIGITAL PRUCESSUR
IMh( - IMMEDIATE
If4S -- INHIBIT MAIN STORE
IRS/ pok - INHIBIT MAIN STOKE/YOWEK 014 RESET SIGNALS
t-IMT - ILC MLSSAGE TABLE
1 IMO - INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT
INIRPT - INTERRUPT
IDA I/U ADAPTER
IUB -- 1!0 BOX
IOM -	 INPUT/OUTPUT MODULE
IUP - INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR
IDPIMS. - INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR INHIBIT MAIN STORE
IOPT -= PCh(MU 1/0 PARAMETER TABLE
IUQE - INPUT/OUTPUT QUEUE ELEMENT
IPL - INITIAL PROGRAM LOAD
IFLL - INITIAL PROGRAML qAU COMPLETE
IVLS - INITIAL PROGRAM LOAD START
IPR - INPUT PROBLEM REPORT
t
t









































— INTER-RANGE INSTRUMENTATILN GROUP TELEMETRY STANDARDS
— INHIBIT/OVERRIDE SUMMARY SNAPSHOT DISPLAY
— INTEGRATED TEST AREA
— INITIAL TIHEOUT
— INTERFACE UNIT
— INTERFACE UNIT ADDRESS
— INTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
— JOB CONTROL LANGUAGE




— KEYBOARD UNIT (IN MCUS)
— KEYBOARD . UNIT ADAPTER
— KILOMETER/HOUR
— THOUSANDS OF UPERATIONS PER SECOND
— KEYBOARD VERIFICATION TABLE
— KEYBOARD
— LIFT TO DRAG f
— LOAD BASE REGISTER
-- INDUCTOR--CAPACITOR
— LOAD CKaSS—COUPLE REGISTER
— LRU COMMAND SIGNAL TO NIA
-- LOGIC CONTROL OUTPUT MODULE
— LRU DATA AVAILABLE SIGNAL TO MIA
-- LAUNLH DATA BUS
— LANDING/DECELERATION SUisSYSTEM
— LOCK GROUP TABLE
— LEFT INBOARD
— LEFT OUTBOARD
— LAUNCH PROCESSOR SYSZEM
— LOAD PROGRAM STATUS
— LRU RECEIVE ENABLE SIGNAL TO MIA
— LOGICAL RECORDS OF FIXED LENCATH
— LRU RESET SIGNAL Til MIA
— LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT
-- LOCAL STORE
— LAUNLH SEQUENCE PROCESSOR
— LEAST SIGNIFICANT BIT
— LARGE-SCALE INTEGRATION
--'LRU TRANSMIT ENABLE SIGNAL TO MIA
— LOAD TIMEDUT REGISTER
r
LVDT
— LINEAR VOLTAGE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSFORMER 	 -
j 	 H - METERS
(	 HA -- MICRO ARCHITECTURE
HA - MILLIAMPERE
MACH — VELOCITY RELATIVE TO THE SPEED OF SOUND
MACRO. — MERGE AND CORRELATE RECURUEO OUTPUT
MACT — MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION CONTROL TABLE
MAEP — MINIMUM AUTOLAND..ENTRY POINT
i HAL — MALFUNCTION
( MAT - MCOS ALLOCATION TABLE
MBUS — MAIN BUS
MC
— MACHINE .CHECK INTERRUPT.
1 MGDS — MULTEPUNCTION CATHODE RAY TUBt.DISPLAY SYSTEM


























































— MANIPULATOR CONTROLLER INTERFACE UNIT
— MASTER CONTROLLER INTERFACE UNIT
— EXTERNAL MEMORY CONFIGURATION DISCRETE
EXTERNAL MEMORY CONFIGURATION DISCRETE
— EXTERNAL MEMORY CONFIGURATION DISCRETE
— EXTERNAL MEMORY CONFIGURATION DISCRETE
HAIN MEMORY, DATA OUTPUT BUS
— MODULATOR DEMODULATOR
-- MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER
— MIA DATA READY SIGNAL TO LRU
— MAIN ENGINE
— RASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER
— MAIN ENGINE CUTOFF
— MISSION ELAPSED TIME
— fiAJOR FUNCTION
-- MULTIFUNCTION OVERLAY
— MULTIPLEXER INTERFACE ADAPTER
— MULTILAY£R INTERCONNECTION BOARDS
— MASS MEMORY
— MILLIMETERS OF MERCURY
— ?SASS MEMORY UNIT
— MOMENTARY
— MASTER POWER—ON RESET
MODULAR POWER SUPPLY
-- MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
— MOST SIGNIFICANT BIT
— MICROWAVE SCAN BEAM LANDING SYSTEM
— MASTER SEQUENCE CONTROLLER (IN IOP)




= MISSION SPECIALIST STATION
— MASS STORAGE UNIT
— MISSION TIME
— MASTER THRUST CONTROLLER
— SCE MAXIMUM TIMEOUT
MICROPROGRAMMED TEST SYSTEM
— MAGNETIC TAPE SYSTEM
— MASTER TIMING UNIT





— NATIUNAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
— NAVIGATION




— NOMINAL STRING ASSIGNMENT TABLE
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
- NOSEWHLEL STEERING



























































- OUTPUT DATA GATk {?!
- OUTPUT DATA REDUNDANCY
- ORBITAL FLIGHT
- OPERATIONAL FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION











- PARALLEL TO ; SERIAL CONVEKTERS




- PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD
- PROGRAM! CONTROLLED INPUT
- PULSE CODE MODULATION
- PULSE CODE MODULATION 14ASTER UNIT
- PROGRAM CONTROLLED OUTPUT
-- PITCH AXIS CONTROL SUUMODULE
- PROCESS CONTROL TABLE
- PROCESS DIRECTORY ENTRY
- PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER
- PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW
- PROGRAM EXCEPTION INTERRUPT
- PARITY ERROR
- PRELIMINARY EFFECTIVE ADDRESS
-- PHASED TIME ELAPSED
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROL RESET
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
POTTER GENERATION SUBSYSTEM











PERFORMANCE MONITOR ANNUNCIATOR DRIVER
-- PARALLEL MULTIPLEXER INTERFACE ADAPTER
- PERFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM
- PCM (PULSE CODE MODULATION} MASTER UNIT
- POWER ON
105
' 7 PO -
POD - PARAMETER OVERRIDE DISPLAY
i	 POI -- POWER ON/OFF INTERRUPT
POID - POWER OFF INTERRUPT DELAYtU
f	 POIL - POWER SUPPLY INHIBIT LINE
POR -- POWER-ON RESET
PRO - PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOLUMENT
PRF - PULSE REPETITION FREQUENCY
PRY -- PRIMARY
PRIG - PRIORITY FUNCTION
PRO - PROCEED
PROM - PROGRAMMABLE READ--ONLY MtKORY
PS -- POWER SUPPLY
PSA - PREFERRED STORAGE AREA
PSA - PREFERRED STORAGE AREA
PSSIT - POWER SUPPLY BUILT-IN TEST
PSP - PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
PSW - PROGRAM STA TUS WEIRD
PTO - PROGRAM TESTING DOCUMENT
PUT - POWER UP TRIGGER (?)
PVT - PRESSURE VOLUME TEMPERATURE:




RA - RADAR ALTIMETER
RACM -- ROLL AXIS CONTROL MODULE
RAD - RADIANS
RAI - RADAR ALTIMETER INDICATOR
RALT - RADAR ALTIMETER
RAH - RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY
RAH - REPEAT UNTIL ALL BCES ARE WAITING
RC - RESISTOR-CAPACITOR
RCC - REDUNDANCY CONNECTION CONTROL
RCS -- RECEIVED COMMAND SYNC SIGNAL FROM MIA TO LRU
RCS - REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
ROD - REW IREMENT DEFINITION DOCUMENT
ROL - RECEIVE DATA LONG (FORMAT)
RDP - REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPEMENT -PLAN
RDS - RECEIVE DATA SHORT (FORMAT)
ROW -RESPONSE DATA WORD (FROM DEU)
REC - RECEIVE
REGCLK - REGISTER CLOCK SIGNAL FROM MIA TO LRU
RET - RETURN
RF -- RADIO FREQUENCY
RFD - REQUIREMENT FORMULATION UUCUMENY
RFI - RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE
RG -- RATE GYRO
RGA - RATE GYRO ASSEMBLY
RGT -- RATE GROUP TABLE
RHC - ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
RI - REGISTER IMMEDIATE.
RIB - RESET INDICATOR BIT
RIB - RIGHT INBOARD
RICC - REMOTE INTERCOMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE
106	 C,r,110DUOtMT	 C^ F i!"
RJDA -- REACTION JET DRIVER AFT
RJDF - REACTION JET DRIVER FORWARD
" RJOD -- REACTION JET OHS DRIVER
RH -- REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
AMC - REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT CONTROL
ROB - RIGHT OUTBOARD
ROM -- READ-ONLY MEMORY
RDS - READS-ONLY STORE
ROSAR -- READ ONLY STORE ADDRESS REGISTER
ROSBR - MICROPROGRAM LINK REGISTER
ROSOR - READ ONLY STORE DATA REGISTER
RPM -- REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE
RPTA - RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
RR -- REGISTER TO REGISTER
RR - RENDEZVOUS RADAR
RREU - RENDEZVOUS RADAR ELECTRONICS UNIT
hS -- REGISTER TO STORAGE
Rs - REDUNDANT SETS
R`3 - REDUNDANCY STATUS
RSIFN - RESET INTERFACE SIGNAL
RTC -- REAL-TIKE COMMAND
RTCE - ROTATION AND TRANSLATION LONTROL ELECTRONICS
RTLS - RETURN TO LAUNCH SITk
RWM - READ/WRITE MEMORY
S - SIGN BIT
S -- POWER TRANSIENT FLAG ( IN RUH)
S/C -- SIGNAL CONDITIONER
S/D - SKELETON/DYNAMIC
S/W •- SOFTWARE
SACS - SYSTEM SOFTWARE.AVIONICS COMMAND SUPPORT
i	 SAIL -- SHUTTLE AVIONICS INTEGRATION LABORATORY
SAR - STORAGE ADDRESS REGISTER
SAT - STRING ASSIGNMENT TABLE_
BATS - SHUTTLE AVIONICS TEST SYSTEM
SB - SPEEDBRAKE
• SBAS - S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH
SBHC -- SPEEDBRAKE HAND CONTROLLER
- 1	 SBMC - SPEEDBRAKE MANUAL CONTROL	 -
SBTC - SPEEDBRAKE THRUST CONTROLLERIf}	
SC - SUPERVISOR CALL INTERRUPT
SC -- STORAGE COMPLETE (FOR POWER DOWN)
I	 SC - SYSTEM CONTROL SOFTWARE
SC$ - SOFTWARE CONTROL BOARD
SCC -- SCM COMPARISON DISPLAY
1	 SCLN - STORAGE ADDRESS REGISTER LOAD LOCK
SCH - SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
SCE - SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION MONITORING
SCM - SYSTEM CONTROL MODULE
SCSN -- SPLIT CYCLE STORE COMMAND LINE
SCT - SUBCOM TABLE
SCU - SEQUENCE CONTROL UNIT
SCW - SEARCH COMPLETE WORD
SDAN - BIT COUNT ERROR SIGNAL FKUM MIA TO LRU
SDF - SIMULATION DATA FILE
SOL - SUFTWARL• DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY
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SUR - STORA6L DATA REGISTER
SUR -- SERIES DISSIPATIVE REGULATOR
^•	 SUR - SOFTWARE DESIGN KEQUTAL14ENTS
SOS - SHUTTLE DYNAMICS SIMULATOR
SUT - STRING DEFINITION TABLE
SELN - SELECT (MEMORY INITIATE SIGNAL)
SEUNG - SEQUENCING
SEV - MESSAGE VALIDITY TEST
SF - SCALE E-ACTOK
SF -- SELECT10% FILTER
SFC - SELCTION FILTER CONTROL
52 - SYMBUL GENERATION
nGLS - SPACE-GROUND LINK SUBSYSTEM
SEiS - SIMULATION HARDWARE SYSTEM
Si - STORAGE IMMEDIATE
SIB - SET INDICATOR BIT
Sim -- SIMULATION
sit) - SERIAL 1/0
SIP -- SYSTEM INTERFACE PROLESSOR
SM - SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
SMCM - SMALL MODULAR CORE MEMORY (IN OEU)
SMRD - SPIN MOTOR RUN UIRECTOR/DIRECTION
SMSC - SOFTWARE MODINGr SEQUENCING AND CONTROL
SMT - STRING MODE TABLE
SUDS - SUBSYSTEM OPERATING AND CHECKuUT SYSTEM
SOP - SOFTWARE OPERATING PROGRAM
SOH -- STATEMENT OF WORK
SP0BK - SPEEDBRAKE
SPEC - SPECIALIST FUNCTION
SPGAI - SURFACE POSITION GIMBAL ANGLE_INDICATOR
SPI -	 SURFACE POSITION INDIi:ATEIR
5PL - SCRATCH PAD LINE
SPU - SHALL PROCESSOR Flit DISPLAY CONTROLLER)
$y - SUPER QUEUE
SRt3 - SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
SRM - SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
SRS -- SHORT REGISTER TO STORAGE
SRU -
SSAU - SOFTWARE SYSTEM ANALYSIS DOCUMENT
SSL - STORE STATUS AND CLEAR
SSD - SPACECRAFT SOFTWARE DIVISION
SSOD - SOFTWARE SYSTEM DESIGN DOCUMENT
SSIP - SYSTEMS SOFTWARE INTERFACE PROCESSING
SSL -- SYSTEM SOFTWARE LOADER
550 - SYSTEMS SOFTWARE OFFICE
SSW - STORE STATUS AND WAIT
ST -- STAR TRACKER
STAOU - SYSTEM TERMINATION AND DISPLAY UNIT
STUN - SPACE TRACKING ANO DATA NETWORK
STP - SELF-TEST PROGRAM
STP1N - STOP CONTROL SIGNAL
STP2N - STOP CONTROL SIGNAL
STRLN - DMA STORE CONTROL SIGNAL
STRN - PURE STORE CU14TR13L SIGNAL (EXTERNAL MEMORY)


























































— SUPERVISOR GALL INSTRUCTION




— TACAN INPUT CARD
— 
TACTICAL AIR NAVIGATION
— TAKEOVER ACTUATOR COMMAND FADING MODULE
— TERMINAL AREA ENERGY HANA&EMENT
TRUE AIRSPEED
— TOTAL AIR TEMPERATURE




-- TRANSMIT COMMAND SYNC
TEST CALL SUPERVISOR
TEST CONTROL SUPERVISOR SEQUENCE PROCESSOR
TEST CONTROL SUPERVISOR SINGLE COMMAND PROCESSOR
-- TEMPERATURE CONTROLLED VOLTAGE REGULATORS
-- TRANSMIT DATA LONG (FORMAT)
- TRACKING AND DATA RELAY SATELLITE
-- TRACKING AND DATA RELAY SATELLITE SYSTEM
— TRANSMIT DATA SHORT (FORMAT)
— 
TELEMETRY FORMAT LOAD
— TOTAL FIELD OF VIEW
-- TELEMETRY FORMAT SELECTION
INTERWORD GAP TIME (Y)
-- TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
— TIME HOMOGENEOUS DATA SET CONTROL/BUFFER TABLE
-- TIME HOMOGENEOUS-RATA SET CROSS REFERENCE.TABLE	 _..




— TEST OPERATIONS CENTER
— TIMER QUEUE- ELEMENT
— TRANSMITTER/RECLIVER
TRANSFER	 _.
TEST REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION DOCUMENT 	 -
-- TRISTATE REGISTER ENABLE NOT SIGNAL FROM MIA TO LRU




— THRUST VECTOR CONTROL
— THRUST VECTOR CONTROL DRIVER
-- USER—WRITTEN CONTROL PR06RAM
— UTILITY AND DATA FLOW
— UI DOWNLIST STORAGE HUFFI-k
— ULTRA—HIGH FREQUENCY
— USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE
— USER INTERFACE MODULI.
— UNIVERSAL TIME COMPENSATEU
— UNIVERSAL TEST EuUIf.sMENT
- UNIVERSAL TIME 1
V
— VALIDITY FLAG (IN RDW)
VLO — VOLTAGE—CONTkOLLEU OSCILLATOR
VuS
— VEHICLE DYNAMIC SIHULATUR SYSTEM
r	
'	 VuMCM
-- VEr.T1CAL UYf,.O MISALIGNMENT COMPtNSATION MODULE
VREF — VULTAGE REFtRtNCk
VSI — VERTICAL SPtEO INUICATGR
H/PI	 (OR 2) — WAY POINT 1 (Uk 2)
WAT — WAIT
ttc.J -- WIDE iSAND
r[bt uM — Milt BAND FKLwuENGY ulVlalUN MULTIPLEXER
wUAL -- WHEELS DOWN AND LOCKEL
'	 nIX — HAIi FUR INUEX INSTRUCTluN
HUNG — K%IGHT UN NOSE GEAR
wow -- WEIGHT ON WHEELS
WK
itSC
— wURKING REG15T Cet
— WIUE BAND SIGNAL CUNUITIUNER
	
^1
XUDSN — TRAN.':-MIT DISAOLE ulSLRETE
	 3
XFER — TkANSPLR
-	 AMT — TRANSMITTEk
	 i
YALM - YAW AXIS CONTROL MUDULc
5	 1 X X -- rllbH SPEED SN5400 TTL ClkLUITS
5 .tmxx STANLARU SPtkD SN5406 ITL LIRCUITS
5 ,rSXX — HIt^HE'.ST SPrE[s SNSkuu TTL LIKCUITS
T
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